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ABSTRACT
THE "LOYALIST PROBLEM" IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
NATURALIZATION, NAVIGATION AND THE CULTURAL
SOLUTION, 1783-1850.
By
Emily Iggulden
University of New Hampshire, September, 2008

Traditionally, studies of the Loyalists from the American Revolution highlight their
wartime experience or explore their post-war experience as exiles in other areas of
the British Empire. Instead, this study begins in 1783 and focuses on the majority of
Loyalists who stayed in the United States after Independence. Using legal
documents, personal correspondence, and popular newspapers the "Loyalist Problem
in the Early Republic," analyzes the legal and cultural dimensions of citizenship
from the Loyalist's perspective. It suggests that the Loyalists played a significant
role in the legal and cultural formation of American citizenship and national identity.
Additionally, it explores the Loyalists role in shaping American commercial policy
and suggests the loyalists had a greater influence than has been traditionally
recognized.

1
Introduction

Few events in American history have captured the historian's imagination more
than the American Revolution. From the progressive historians of Charles Beard's cohort
at the turn of the twentieth century, through the social historians of the 1960s and now the
post-modern/postcolonial scholars of the twenty-first century, the Revolution provides
the locus around which the historical profession explores the development of American
society.1 Even the loyalists, the big losers in the contest, have received adequate, if
somewhat narrow attention. In fact, after the neo-Progressive historians displaced the old
"consensus" school in the 1960s, historians have emphasized the internal conflicts of the
war and most historians now characterize the Revolution as a civil conflict.

1

Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, (New York,
Macmillan, 19060,c,1935), Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible, (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1979)
Richard Ryerson, "The Revolution is now begun ": the radical committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776,
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), when I refer to 'postmodern/postcolonial I refer in
particular to the recent roundtable discussion in the William and Mary Quarterly led by Jack P. Greene,
"Roundtable: Colonial History and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem," in William
and Mary Quarterly, (April 2007) Of course Greene advocates a move away from treating the Revolution
as a boundary and a barrier between the colonial and national periods but in so doing he highlights the trend
thus far in American historiography.
2
John Higham classified the "consensus" school in a 1959 article for Commentary. Higham identified,
Daniel Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics, Louis Hartz's, The Liberal Tradition in America
(1955), David Potter's People of Plenty, (1954) and Richard Hofstadter's Age of Reform (1955) has
members of a "consensus" approach to history. These historians smoothed over conflict in America's past
and instead emphasized consensus and accord. The rise of the neo-progressive historians in the 1960s on
the campus' of the University of Wisconsin and California in particular, collapsed the consensus school and
replaced it with recognition of the vitality of disagreement in American history. Towards a New Past:
Dissenting Essays in American History, (1967) witnessed the turning point. Barton Bernstein edited the
eclectic collection that included Jesse Lemisch's now famous argument about "The Revolution Seen from
the Bottom Up" and also Eugene Genovese's early work on the Old South. Emphasis on conflict in
American history as an invigorating source of change paved the way for renewed scholarship on the
Loyalists. The above discussion is culled from Ellen Fitzpatrick, History's Memory, (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2002) chapter five and the epilogue.
The current dominate monographs that characterize the Revolution as a civil conflict are: Bernard Bailyn,
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University,
1967), ed., Jack P. Greene, The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, (New York, Harper and Row,
1968), Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1992),
Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press,
1969), ed., Jack P. Greene, Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: a documentary history of the American
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One consequence of interpreting the Revolution as a civil war was to encourage
scholars to pay attention to the Loyalists. Historians sought to find answers to the
question of motivation and demographics: why did certain individuals or certain regions
remain loyal to the King? How was loyalty to the Crown expressed and how was it
punished or rewarded? How powerful was the internal opposition to independence and
why did its supporters fail? Wallace Brown initiated the current interest in the Loyalists
in 1965 with The Kings' Friends, which is a systematic examination of the nature of
loyalism in each of the thirteen colonies.3 The book encouraged Brown to reach the now
universally accepted conclusion that loyalism was not a cohesive movement but varied in
each colony in type, quantity and intensity.4 As a result, historians treated the Loyalists as
an anomaly, a problem to investigate and explain.
Brown's approach set the precedent for subsequent studies of the Loyalists. Most
are sympathetic in nature and focus on pre-war time motivations and treatment of the
Loyalists during and immediately after the War, 1765-1783.5 Most of the books are either

Revolution, (New York, Norton, 1975), Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence of Empire; British political culture
in the age of the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 2000), Andrew Jackson
O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided; The American Revolution and the British Caribbean, (Philadelphia,
University of Philadelphia Press, 2000).
3
Wallace Brown, The Kings Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claims,
(Providence, Brown University Press, 1965). Lorenzo Sabine was the first to attempt to tackle the Loyalist
problem in 1847 with his invaluable contribution, Biographical Sketches of the Loyalists of the American
Revolution.3 Sabine's study paved the way for interest in the losers of the Revolution and provided factual
foundations to accelerate future study.
4
Brown actually made this conclusion explicit in his later book The Good Americans which drew on •
similar sources but broadened the definition of loyalism from simply those who made financial claims for
compensation to the "rank and file." Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, William Morrow and
Company, 1969)
5
See for example, Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution,
(Baltimore: Genealogical Pub, Co, reprint 2005), Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists of the American
Revolution, (Bowie, Md. Heritage Books, 1989, original 1902), Brown, The Good Americans, (New York,
William Morrow and Company, 1969), Catherine S. Crary, The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the
Revolution, (New York, MGraw Hill, 1973), Robert M. Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary America,
1760-1781, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). William H. Nelson, The American Tory,
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, c 1961) North Callahan, Flight from the Republic, (Indianapolis, BobbsMerrill, 1967). A big trend in biographies of famous loyalists was also emerging in the late 1960s, see for
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biographies of individual loyalists or regional case studies that offer useful, if somewhat
biased and narrow treatment of the Loyalists.6 Additionally, scholars such as Paul H.
Smith and John Shy tracked the military contributions of the Loyalists and their
relationship with the British troops.7 Although many of these studies made important
contributions, much of the work on the Loyalists was antiquarian and genealogical in
style and not analytical nor academic enough to be integrated into the mainstream
Q

revolutionary narrative. The 'school' of loyalist historians remained on the periphery of
American historiography despite its active and enthusiastic members.
To the extent that the Loyalists exist in American historiography after 1783 it is as
new settlers in Canada, Britain and the West Indies, not as American citizens on the
mainland.9 In reality, only 1/5 of loyalists actually left the newly independent states after
the Peace of Paris in 1783. The majority, as many as 413,000 remained behind and made
example, L.F.S. Upton, The Loyal Whig: William Smith of New York and Quebec, (Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1969) and slightly later Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, (Cambridge,
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1974).
The antiquarian style of many of these biographies is evident in the trade or sometimes personal
publications rather than academic press. See for example, Eugene R. Fingerhut, Survivor: Cadwallader
Colden IF in Revolutionary America, (Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), Brian C. Cuthbertson, Loyalist
Governor: Biography of John Wentworth, (New Hampshire, Petheric Press, 1983) James Henry Stark, The
loyalists of Massachusetts and the other side of the Revolution, (Boston, J.H. Stark, 1910), Robert Orley
DeMond, The loyalists in North Carolina during the Revolution, (Hamden, Archon Books, 1964), David E.
Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists, (New York, Garland, 1989). Robert Munro Brown's
Ph.D. dissertation at the University of New Hampshire reflects this trend to quantify and classify the
loyalists in a bid to make them more understandable, Robert Munro-Brown, "We deserved a better fate"
Loyalists in Revolutionary New Hampshire (Ph.D dissertation, University of New Hampshire, 1983).
7
Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill, Published
for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1964),
John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Civil War," in Stephen G.
Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, Published for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1973)
8
Maja Jasanoff makes this point in her recent WMQ article, The Other Side of the Revolution; Loyalists in
the British Empire." Jasanoff correctly classifies Sabine's study as genealogical as well as the On-Line
Institute of Advanced Loyalist Studies, www.royalprovinivial.com. One might add,
9
See for example, Wallace Brown, The Kings Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American
Loyalist Claims, (Providence, Brown University Press, 1965), North Callahan, Flightfrom the Republic,
(Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), Mary Beth Norton, The British-Americans: The Loyalist Exile in
England, 1774-1789, (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1972), Anne Y. Zimmer, Jonathan Boucher;
loyalist in exile, (Detriot, Wayne State University Press, 1978).
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lives for themselves in the new republic. This study responds to this missed opportunity
in the historiography and offers a new perspective on the post-war history of the
American loyalists.
"The Loyalist Problem in the Early Republic" begins where most other studies
end, on the American mainland in 1783. In contrast to previous studies, it is not solely
about the Loyalists but addresses the themes of naturalization and international trade in
the nineteenth century through the lens of the loyalist experience. The first scholars on
the Loyalists sought to recover the "losers" of the Revolution and include them in the
mainstream narrative of the war. These historians sought to re-balance the biased history
of the Revolution and animated their studies with sympathy and respect for the losers of
the Revolution.11 Because these historians were successful, this study looks instead at the
legacy of the Revolution in the Early American Republic and focuses on the loyalist role
in that legacy. To do so, it asks slightly different questions than previous work. It is less
concerned with motives and type and instead approaches the subject from a political,
legal and cultural perspective. How did loyalists who chose to stay in America adapt to
the new administration? How did those Americans who supported independence react to
these 'disloyal' citizens? Given America's continued reliance on trade with the British
Empire after 1783, how did those who supported the Crown in the Revolution affect the
Scholars disagree on the total number of loyalists but there is recent consensus around the 20% mark.
According to Moses Coit Tyler John Adam's asserted that a 1/3 of the American population were loyal to
the crown, Moses Coit Tyler, "The Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution," in The American
Historical Review, vol 1, (Oct 1895) 24-45. Modern scholars put the figure nearer 20% see for example,
Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Numerical Strength," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3 rd series, 25, (April 1968) 259-277. All of the key monographs on loyalists acknowledge that
the majority stayed behind, see Wallace Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, Morrow, 1969) 251.
1
' In the bibliographical essay of the The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays, Robert M. Calhoon
characterizes the comprehensive texts on the loyalists as "sympathetic to their subjects." Bernard Bailyn
made these bias' clear in his introduction to The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson in which he stated he was
doing something different; "My purpose, then, is to convey something of the experience of the losers of the
American Revolution. And I do this not because I agree with them or judge them to have been right or
because I find them more appealing people than their opponents." X.
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trade policy between the two nations? Finally, how did the growing sense of national
pride and identity in the nineteenth century include, explain or forgive the Loyalists?
In 1970, Wallace Brown asserted that "something of a renaissance" was taking
place with loyalist historiography. He predicted a "golden age" of loyalist history was
about to begin and he especially looked forward to the establishment of the Program for
Loyalist Studies and Publications.12 George Billias echoed Brown's eagerness for
renewed scholarship on the Loyalists, when he observed in 1972 that the Loyalists
remained the first 'Un-Americans' in American historiography. Billias' complained that
historians still considered Loyalists as entirely different from their patriot peers and,
though treated seriously by historians, loyalists remained an anomaly in the historical
record.13
Brown's optimism was well placed but also prescient because at present, the
Loyalists are once again enjoying a revival in American historiography. Maya Jasanoff is
currently working on a book about the global experience of the Loyalists in exile.14 Alan
Taylor is engaged in a study of the Loyalist exiles in Canada and their influence on
imperial identity.15 Liam Riordan is researching four individual loyalists on four different
continents to explore the exile experience from a global and personal perspective.16

12

Wallace Brown, "The View at Two Hundred Years" in Proceedings of the American Antiquarian
Society, (Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1970) 47. He cited such works as William H. Nelson,
The American Tory, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1966), L.F.S. Upton's work, Wilbur H. Seibert's
contributions as well as North Callahan.
13
George A Billias, "The First Un-Americans; The Loyalists in American Historiography," George Billias
A. and Vaughan, Alden T. ed., Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honor of Richard B.
Morris, (New York; Harper & Row, 1973).
14
Maja Jasanoff, "The Other Side of the Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire," William and Mary
Quarterly, (April 2008)
15
Alan Taylor, "The Late Loyalists; Northern Reflections on the Early American Republic," Journal of the
Early Republic 27 (Spring 2007).
16
In conversation with the author at the New England Historical Association Conference, (Northeastern
University, Boston, April 26).
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As with the work of these scholars, this thesis focuses on the post 1783
experience and shares the interest in the political and cultural legacy of the loyalists.
However, this study looks at the loyalists who remained in the newly independent United
States rather than those exiled by the new republic. Although it shares the interest in the
contributions the Loyalists made to American history, it looks beyond the traditional
temporal boundaries of 1775-1783 to assess how far their influence reached. It builds on
Oscar Zeichner and David E. Maas' attention to what happened to remaining and
returning Loyalists on the American mainland. Both Zeichner and Maas focused on
regional case studies: New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts.17 This study attempts
to broaden that analysis to a national level and from a legal and political angle rather than
the bibliographic approach Maas adopts.
Chapter One looks specifically at the problem of dual allegiance and the question
of citizenship from a legal and cultural perspective. Using the definition of loyalists
articulated in the Treaty of Paris (1783), this study analyzes the extent to which
Americans at the local level accepted these definitions. New York, Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts will act as case studies to represent how Americans interpreted and
implemented the treaty. Public broadsides written by Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin
Rush reveal the division within the states on how to interpret the language of the treaty
and the identity of loyalists. The chapter draws attention to the duality of the loyalists'
allegiance in the Revolution and suggests this duality explains the continued problem of
legal definitions in the 1780s. It traces individual experiences such as those of Tench
17

Oscar Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," in New England Quarterly XI,
(June, 1938) 308-330, Oscar Zeichner, "The Loyalist Problem in New York After the Revolution,"
New York History, XXI (1940)David E. Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists 17751790," (New York, Garland, 1989).
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Coxe and Peter Van Schaack to illuminate the personal experience of the law. The role of
the loyalty oath and its use against the loyalists in the revolutionary and into the national
period reinforces how Americans contested the legal status of loyalists. Chapter one
suggests that the individual loyalists who were allowed to return or remain in their
communities all brought with them economic prosperity and skills useful to the
community. This sense of "usefulness, " of civic virtue and its influence on the meaning
of American citizenship is re-visited again in chapter three from the perspective of
memory.
Chapter Two asses the loyalist problem from the standpoint of foreign trade. In
1972, Charles Ritcheson asserted that the loyalists had little influence on British or
American policy after 1783. This chapter offers a different perspective based on analysis
of British and American trading policy in the 1780s and the 1790s. The two treaties of the
period, Paris (1783) and Jay's (1796) supply the legal anchors governing the era.
Navigation and shipping rights continued to generate hostility between Britain and
America as the former mother country refused to grant American vessels permission to
trade with the West Indies. The role loyalist merchants in the West Indies played in
subverting British trade restrictions is explored and the chapter asserts that the Loyalist
merchants in the West Indies actually benefited the American and West Indian economy.
In doing so, it challenges Charles Ritcheson's assertion that loyalists were insignificant in
the new republic. Additionally, it highlights the political and commercial links between
the Early Republic and those areas of the British Atlantic still in the colonial period and
emphasizes the importance of the loyalists in this relationship.

8
Chapter Three shifts the emphasis from the Confederation period to the heart of
the Early Republic (1805-1850). It revisits the question of citizenship explored in chapter
one and the issue of navigation investigated in chapter two. The War of 1812 supplies the
locus around which these ideas of naturalization and the problem of navigation collide. In
contrast to the legal emphasis in the first two chapters, this section addresses the problem
of the loyalists from a cultural perspective. It is concerned solely with the memory of
loyalists rather than the actions of living loyalists. This approach offers an angle on how
Americans in the Early Republic remembered the internal divisions during the
Revolution and how they used them positively to develop the meaning of American
citizenship. It looks at the ways newspapers and magazines rehabilitated infamous
loyalists or "Tories" from the Revolution as useful American citizens. Magazines used
individual loyalists as models to demonstrate how American citizenship was to be earned
through merit rather than a de facto right of birth.18 Political parties in the Early Republic
also used the memory of the first "Un-Americans" as a political insult to the party
opposition. The chapter explores the similarities between the partisan divisions loyalists
The chapter subscribes to David Waldstreicher and Simon P. Newman's definition and use of popular
print culture. In "Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent," Waldstreicher proposes that the coverage of national
parades, fetes, and celebrations in print played an integral role in communicating feelings of consensus and
national unity to communities across the New Republic. He argues that it was the replication of such events
in newspapers, magazines and almanacs, which strengthened and developed a unique American identity
and nationality. The same principle is applied here to the presentation of Tories in print as an example of
what American readers were encouraged to regard as fundamentally un-American. David Waldstreicher,
"Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent: Celebrations, Print Culture and the Origins of American Nationalism,"
in The Journal of American History, 82, no.l (1995) David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes:
the making of American Nationalism 1776-1820, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
Simon P. Newman, Parades and Politics of the Street, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,
1998).I have also drawn on Elizabeth L.Eisentein's understanding of written communication as especially
influential in effecting the 'hearts and minds' of readers. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change;
communications and cultural transformations in early modern Europe, (Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press, 1979). Jennifer Tebbe's definition of print culture as both 'economic commodity and cultural agent'
has also been instructive - this paper ascribes to her assertion that a society's culture is created and
maintained through the books, magazines and newspapers it generates, Jennifer Tebbe, "Print and
American Culture" in American Quarterly, 32, 3 (1980) 259-279. Finally, Benedict Anderson's Imagined
Communities; Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London; New York, Verso, 2006)
linked the use of print culture to the much bigger picture of national identity.

9
caused in the Revolution and its immediate aftermath with the discords the memory of
the loyalists created between political parties in the early nineteenth century. For
example, during the War of 1812 the Democratic-Republicans co-opted the term "Tory"
to fire as an insult against the Federalist party opposition. The terms connotations with
the internal enemies of the Revolution undermined the Federalists by classifying them as
enemies to American liberty and sovereignty. The chapter continues to trace the political
use of the term through the 1820s and the 1830s. Consequently, this section shows that
the loyalists continued to act as a vibrant cultural force in the Early Republic.
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that the history of the loyalists is not simply a
history of losers or disaffected aristocrats. Nor is it a history of ideology or motivation
during a time of civil conflict. It need not be reduced to a list of names and professions
but can illuminate the story of naturalization, navigation and the meaning of American
citizenship from the Revolution through the early nineteenth century.

10
Chapter 1
Internal Exiles: "Disloyal Citizens" or "Illegal aliens:" The Loyalists
and American citizenship 1783-1790

In 1775, British ships sailed from the ports of Boston, New York,
and Charleston with loyalists aboard seeking refuge in other parts of the
Empire. It seemed to many observers at the time and to historians now a
mass departure: Abigail Adam's described the first ships that left Boston
as akin to a forest with "upward of one hundred and seventy sail
counted."

More recently, North Callahan described the exits as

"hopeless confusion" and captured the mood of the time by citing a
popular rhyme of the period, "The Tories with their brats and wives/Have
fled to save their wretched lives." Susannah Well's personal diary of the
experience reinforces the reality of such an image as she shared her "joy,
so truly [to be] in the wide Ocean out of the dominion of Congress."21 It is
certainly romantic to picture as Callahan does, "the last hectic days of
peace [as if] everybody, the whole world, moved to Nova Scotia."22
Although such romanticism has characterized many studies of the
Loyalists, the statistics simply do not support the notion of an exodus.

I am grateful to Eliga Gould for this phrase which he used to describe the loyalists that remained within
the U.S after the Treaty of Paris in his comments on Maya Jasanoffs "The Other Side of the Revolution:
Loyalists in the British Empire," ( a paper presented at the MHS Early American Seminar, Thursday
February 7th, 2008).
20
Charles Halstead Van Tyne, Loyalists in the American Revolution, (Bowie, Heritage Books, 1989) 58-59,
21
Susannah Wells, The Journal of a Voyage from Charleston to London, (New York, Arno Press, 1968) 4.
22
North Callahan, Flight from the Republic, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967) 27, 30.
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The most reliable sources available indicate that the majority of
Loyalists actually remained in the United States after independence.
Although there is some disagreement on actual figures Paul H. Smith's
calculations have been the most accurate to date. Smith argues there were
513,000 loyalists in America from 1775-1783 and most scholars agree
with Charles Ritcheson's findings that somewhere between 60,000 and
100,000 loyalists left the U.S. in exile. That leaves a minimum of 413,000
loyalists in the newly independent U.S.24 These figures, distributed
throughout the country may not have constituted a significant threat to the
almost 3,000,000 strong American population but are a number larger than
the neglect of loyalists in the historiography indicates.25 This remains an
unexplored yet significant detail in the scholarship on loyalists. How did
413,000 loyalists adapt to the new republic? What was their legal status
and how did this translate to their social standing and integration into the
community?

Scholars disagree on the total number of loyalists but there is recent consensus around the 20% mark.
According to Moses Coit Tyler John Adam's asserted that a 1/3 of the American population were loyal to
the crown, Moses Coit Tyler, "The Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution," in The American
Historical Review, vol 1, (Oct 1895) 24-45. Modern scholars put the figure nearer 20% see for example,
Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Numerical Strength," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3 rd series, 25, (April 1968) 259-277. All of the key monographs on loyalists acknowledge that
the majority stayed behind, see Wallace Brown, The Good Americans, (New York, Morrow, 1969) 251.
24
Charles Ritcheson, "Loyalist Influence on British Policy towards the United States After the American
Revolution," Eighteenth Century Studies, 7, (Autumn, 1972) 1-17. See Smith's article above for those
figures, 269.
Smith, 269. On the marginalization of loyalists from the historiography see George A. Billias,. "The
First Un-Americans: The Loyalists in American Historiography," in ed., Billias George A. and Vaughan,
Alden T. Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honour of Richard B. Morris, New York:
1973.
26
The regional studies of Connecticut and New York by Oscar Zeichner and of Massachusetts by David E.
Maas are an exception to this rule, Oscar Zeichner, "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut," in
New England Quarterly XI, (June, 1938) 308-330, Oscar Zeichner, "The Loyalist Problem in New York
After the Revolution," New York History, XXI (1940), David E. Maas, The Return of the Massachusetts
Loyalists, (New York, Garland, 1989).
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This chapter explores three legal documents of this period and their
application to the loyalists in order to offer possible answers to the above
questions: articles V and VI of The Treaty of Paris 1783, the Test Laws of
1777 and their development into the first Naturalization Law of 1787.
Consideration of the role of Loyalty Oaths helps trace the principle of
allegiance and its applications across the colonial, revolutionary and early
national periods. These oaths permeate the boundary between legal and
social regulations of citizenship. They can demonstrate the disparity
between the legal and social criteria for citizenship and expose the
contested status of the Loyalists in the early national period.
Each document has broad implications, although their impact on
and influence by Loyalists will remain the main focus of this discussion
The argument shows how each document adds a perspective to the issue of
loyalist identity, how British subjects, specifically those whose allegiance
to America was in doubt, made the transition to American citizens. In
addition, the individual experiences of loyalists such as Tench Coxe and
Peter van Schaack illuminate the personal application of the law.
* * *

In order to assess the status of loyalists after the Revolution, it is
first important to outline how the American rebels identified and punished
loyalists during the War. Initially, many loyalists actually supported
colonial resistance to British aggravations such as the Stamp and Sugar
Acts. Indeed, most individuals who came to be known as 'Loyalists'

13
advocated increased American representation in Parliament and resented
Britain's interference in the internal workings of colonial government.
The Reverend Samuel Seabury, an outspoken loyalist, concisely described
this duality as follows, "Many loyalists.. .had not been much happier with
British policies since 1763 but whatever their discontent they stopped
short of rebellion."28 James Allen, a member of the well-respected Allen's
of Pennsylvania also admitted, "I love the cause of liberty but cannot
heartily join in the prosecution of these measures [that are] totally foreign
to the original plan of resistance."29 The case of Samuel Johnson
exemplifies both of these descriptions: Johnson ultimately supported the
Crown and maintenance of the status quo, but during the chaotic years
following the implementation of the Stamp Act in 1765 he sat on the board
of the Stamp Act Congress and advocated the colonist's right to be free
from parliamentary taxation.30 From the outset of rebellion then, loyalists
experienced a duality of allegiance and identity which both compromised
and complicated their social and political relationships.
Consequently, the classification of "Loyalist" as an outright
dissenter to the American cause and champion of the King did not fall into
official use until the introduction of the Test Act in 1777. The
Committee's of Safety and Justices of the Peace administered the Act in
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each colony. As a result, the ways of identifying loyalism in each colony
T1

were slightly different, though all were based on similar principles. In
Massachusetts, "persons suspected of being inimical to the cause of the
colony" had to take the Test Act. In New York an individual who
displayed a "neutral or equivocal; character" was listed, and in
Pennsylvania one needed only to be "suspected of being unfriendly" to be
required to take the Test.32 The 'Test' usually involved performing and
signing an oath of allegiance to the colonies and renouncing all affiliation
to the King.33 Such recitals often took place in the local court house with
the Committee of Safety or a Justice of the Peace overseeing the
procedure. Some colonies allowed local civilians to attend, watch and
pressure individuals into signing. Punishment varied from colony to
colony and became more severe as the war progressed. The most popular
forms of retribution for really "conspicuous" or outspoken Tories was
banishment, either to British occupied territory within the colonies or to
another part of the Empire - all of which the accused paid for out of his
own pocket. The case of the Philadelphia Quakers, who were exiled to
Virginia, bears witness to the format and power of the Test Act and the
significance of the Loyalty Oath as a measure of allegiance.
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Harold Hyman has elegantly documented how ingrained the idea of
loyalty oaths were in colonial American culture. They began as a tool of
the British Empire to secure allegiance to the Crown and served as
"prerequisites for suffrage, office-holding, and naturalization."

During

the Revolution, however, the patriots appropriated the oath. It had the
same basic principles, but a different subject of allegiance. In September
1777, the Philadelphia Committee on Safety deemed Israel Pemberton,
Samuel Pleasants and twenty other individuals "inimical to the cause of
the United States." They were imprisoned in Philadelphia until they agreed
to sign the oath.36 The narrative tells us that Pemberton and the other
exiles' behaviour was considered hostile as they refused to recognize the
authority of the Committee of Safety. This Committee demanded they
agree not to write, speak or act against the Continental Congress as well as
"not depart from [their] dwelling house," which was the point of
contention for the Quakers who considered themselves innocent.37 Despite
the legal remonstrance by the accused against their arrest and the
Committees' demands, their refusal to take the oath equaled guilt.
Although deemed slightly 'less treasonous' than outright conspiracy,
refusal to take the oath still carried punitive measures. In this case, the
punishment was arrest, interrogation and a sentence of internal exile within
the town of Stoughton, Virginia "to be treated according to their characters
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and stations."38 Ultimately, the twenty proscribed individuals were
imprisoned for eight months from September 1777 to April 1778.
Congress released them after deciding their behaviour was no longer
"inimical" and George Washington recognized their refusal to take the
oaths as conscientious objection rather than seditious intent.39
Of course, the case of the Quakers as conscientious objectors is not
perhaps representative of the whole. More typical was the Revered Jacob
Baileys' banishment experience, showing how the states identified loyalty
to the Crown, ordered individuals into exile, confiscated their property,
stripped them of voting rights and all other privileges of citizenship.40 As
minister of the Parish of Pownalborough in Maine Bailey enjoyed a
prominent and influential role in a vibrant and active community. Yet his
actions during the crucial years of 1775-1777 gave the local Committee of
Safety cause for concern. Bailey was accused of conducting seditious
sermons, of praying for the King and was found guilty of refusing to read
the Declaration of Independence. As a result he was called in front of the
Committee for investigation on two separate occasions, yet was able to
convince them of his moral obligation to honor his allegiance to the King.
Although he was not technically proscribed in the Test Act, Bailey was
'asked to leave' and did so after several "molestations."41 He departed for
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Nova Scotia in the summer of 1779. According to Sabine he arrived there
destitute, his face "meagre with famine and wrinkled with solicitude.'
His property in Pownalborough was confiscated and sold for profit; he was
stripped of the right to vote or hold office and consequently he never
returned.43 These individuals found guilty of seditious acts, experienced
disenfranchisement and disempowerment. Obviously, subscription to the
oath was open to abuse and there is evidence that many loyalists who
stayed in the colonies survived by taking the oath of allegiance
hypocritically.44 While this might seem to challenge consideration of them
as loyalists, the way in which their contemporaries in the new republic
continued to treat them as Tories justifies attention to their experience.45
The process of monitoring loyalty and classifying "inimical
behaviour" that culminated in the Test Acts of 1777 actually began more
formally three years earlier when the First Continental Congress was
established in 1774. The subsequent Articles of Association, which
included a colony wide boycott movement on British imports, provided the
first opportunity for tangible evidence of disloyalty. The colonists viewed
refusal to adhere to the non-importation of British goods as a visible sign
of dissent against the colonial cause. Patriots considered non-adherence as
a breach of the "sacred ties of virtue, honour and love of country."46 It
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made dissent incredibly visible as thousands of copies of the Articles of
Association were printed and published up and down the colonies; refusal
to sign or outright flouting of the agreement was deemed the act of a Tory
and identified as "inimical" or "equivocal" or "unfriendly" behaviour.47
Importantly, it was not yet an act of treachery as the "country"
referred to in the Articles was actually Britain and the signers still
considered themselves, "his majesty's most royal British subjects."
Consequently, punishments for the inimical acts against the Associations'
Resolves were administered on a social rather than legal level.
Committeemen were instructed to publicize the traitor, "that all such foes
to the rights of British-America may be publicly known and universally
condemned." Newspaper editors played an important role in this
humiliation process as they published the names of merchants who were
caught flouting the Associations agreement. Such merchants then endured
not only the poisonous reputation of disloyalty but faced the wrath of the
Sons of Liberty. 49 This wrath expressed itself most often and most
venomously through the practice of American charivari; tar and feathering,
the most common form of public retaliation and humiliation in which
supporters of the Crown were literally covered in boiling hot tar and
smothered in feathers. In Boston, one of the most severe colonies towards
disloyalty, the mob set one victim Owen Richards alight after applying the
47
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tar and feathers.50 Indeed, Boston was the hub of tarring and feathering
with a self-proclaimed committee for the purpose advertising its services
through the city.51 In New York, another colony considered "harshest" in
treatment of loyalists, Edward Short was tarred and feathered for refusing
to sign the Articles of Association. In the same state, Samuel Seabury's
published tract against the Continental Congress' resolves was publicly
tarred, feathered and burned.52 Property as well as people was a target of
punishment for equivocal acts.
The attacks generally took place in public and as historian
Benjamin Irvin suggests, "were designed to shame the victim by holding
him up to the derision of the crowd."53 Initially tar and feathering was
committed against highly visible forms of imperial power such as Stamp
Act Officers, imperial Governors or anyone who represented British power
in the colonies. Nevertheless, as the revolution progressed the practice
was adapted and implemented against any individual who seemed to favor
parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, as Irvin's study shows by 1775 it was
no longer a punishment "reserved for imperial custom officials or colonial
informants [but was] meted out to loud mouth lads trumpeting un-patriotic
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beliefs." The number of victims of the custom increased as the
Continental Congress increased monitoring individual loyalty.
In this somewhat arbitrary system of identifying and punishing
loyalists, the severity of retribution by public humiliation obviously
depended on the demographics of each colony. This involved the number
of loyalists in a region, how active or vocal they were in their support of
the Crown and also the character of the committeemen themselves. New
York and South Carolina were the "harshest" in their treatment of
loyalists, due probably to the high proportion of loyalists to the patriot
population. Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania also fall under
the "harsh" category, with the rest of the thirteen states making up the
"light" and "lightest" treatment of those loyal to the King.56 As the war
intensified it became important to adopt a more universal and standardized
system of recognizing and disciplining internal enemies.
The transition from an act characterized as unfavourable and
disloyal to the Articles of Association to one condemned as an illegal act
of treachery against the United Colonies paved the way for formalization
of this law and enactment of the Test Acts. The legal and conceptual shift
became possible after the execution of a man named Thomas Hickey and
the subsequent publication of the Declaration of Independence. In May of
1776, Continental soldier Thomas Hickey became the first individual
executed for treason against America when his role in a plot to aid the
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British army stationed on Long Island was uncovered. The plan was to
burn the Kings Bridge, the main attack route for the Americans to Long
Island and destroy American ships along that section of the east coast.57 A
counterfeit ring was also at the heart of the conspiracy, Hickey and several
other men were in league with the British Governor ,William Tryon, to
CO

diminish the value of continental currency. Indeed, financial gain rather
than any sincere ideological allegiance to the British seemed to be
Hickey's motivation. In fact, his final testimony reads like a young, naive
immigrant who was susceptible to bad influence and made poor decisions;
"Upon my arrival in this city I was led into bad company by William
Green.. .1 was not acquainted with those that laid the plan, but was
promised reward of money. I received two shillings from Green and three
from Forbes and they promised that I should be supplied from others.. ."59
Hickey then was not an ardent supporter of the King, nor a real political
threat but his case set a significant precedent for those who did align
themselves with the British.
Hickey's indictment transformed the meaning of treachery in
America from a crime against the King to a crime against Congress and
each individual colony.60 To return to an earlier example, trading or
57
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consuming British goods was now an act of treason against the United
Colonies rather than an unsatisfactory subversion of colonial agreement.
This was a crucial development, as it presaged the publication of the
Declaration of Independence just one month later in July 1776. Hickey's
case helps to explain the context of the Declaration's specific and virulent
remonstrance against the king.61 The exposure of an internal plot of
sedition helped colonists distance themselves even further from the mother
country and strengthened a sense of colonial solidarity that ultimately
enabled them to renounce allegiance to the King.62 The formalization of
treachery as a crime against the United Colonies further compromised a
Tory's standing in America and makes the high number of Loyalists who
stayed even more surprising and in need of explanation. Treachery was a
concept the Loyalist presence helped define, yet also one that further
contested their legal and social standing in their communities during the
war and also in the future.
In addition, Hickey's case formalized how patriots defined and
punished loyalty across all 13 colonies. In response to Hickey's crime,
George Washington called for a universal application of the loyalty oath to
be required of all civilians, "every state must fix upon some oath or
affirmation of allegiance, to be tendered to all inhabitants without
of Treason, (Seattle, University of Washington, 1964) 35. This was also a significant shift as until this point
committees of correspondence still required loyalty oaths of allegiance to the King, see Hyman chapter 3.
61
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exception and to outlaw those that refuse it."63 The cases of Jacob Bailey
and the Philadelphia Quakers discussed above illustrate the impact of
Washington's vision. The loyalty oath itself was not new as it was always
a feature of colonial life and was also administered in the army and
required of individuals holding civic office during the revolution. However
its transition to ordinary civilians in 1774 signalled the intensity of the
conflict and reflected the impact of loyalist dissent on the American
imagination.
It is clear the legal and social identity of loyalists during the
Revolution was defined but still vulnerable to interpretation by colonial
governments. The definitional question of "inimical" behaviour ensured
each colony could treat its seditious inhabitants as they wished albeit
within the boundaries of the national framework of the Test Act. In
addition, the Treaty of Paris of 1783 largely determined the issue of
Loyalist's legal and social identity after the Revolution.
Although the Treaty declared peace official between Britain and
America its impact on and for loyalists was more complicated and far
reaching than its legal stipulations might suggest. In theory, peace brought
with it an end to dual allegiances. An individual could no longer stay
neutral nor switch allegiance as the situation allowed but had to choose to
which side to 'belong.' As Alexander Hamilton observed at the time, "All
inhabitants who were subjects under the former government and who did
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not withdraw themselves upon the change which took place, were to be
considered citizens, owing allegiance to the new government."65 As
detailed in the introduction, many loyalists already expressed their identity
at the start or near the beginning of the Revolution by moving to a
different part of the British Empire. However, for those that chose to stay
their national identity was decided on September 3 r when the treaty was
signed. James Kettner whose work on American citizenship remains the
most thorough and persuasive described this process as "volitional
allegiance;" an individual chose their identity by deciding on a location to
inhabit at the time the treaty was signed.66 Interestingly, this process
actually required less volition than the traditional practice of loyalty oaths.
In contrast to taking part in mass ceremonies or swearing allegiance in
writing in front of a committee of ones peers, simply being in the place in
which you wanted to be a citizen seems remarkably straightforward.
Careful analysis of articles V and VI of the treaty and attention to the
debates over the issue in New York paint a more complex picture as it
highlights the disparity between the legal document and its practical
application to internal exiles in a social setting.
Article V represented the interests of loyalists who proscribed by
the Committees under the Test Act and were banished and/or their
property was confiscated. It required the united colonies to allow loyalists
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to return "unmolested" within twelve months to try and regain any
property that was confiscated.67 In theory this sounded attainable, yet in
practice the wording was too vague and the sentiment against loyalists too
strong to enable the legal stipulations to be honored in practice. The states
were not required to return confiscated property but "earnestly
recommended'' to, therefore most states were not especially responsive to
such recommendations.68 British Consul Phineas Bond's persistent
petitions to Congress demonstrate the frustration and ineffectiveness of the
law.69 Moreover, Bond's correspondence with Thomas Jefferson
highlighted the weakness of Article V as Jefferson condescendingly asked
Bond if he "must explain the semantic difference between
"recommending" and "enacting?"70 The definitional problem clearly
persisted through the Revolution into the new republic. Article V was
designed to govern loyalists who left the United States but did so largely
unsuccessfully. North Carolina for example continued to sell confiscated
loyalist estates until 1790 and New York passed several discriminatory
laws after the signing of the Treaty.71 In New Jersey the property of
proscribed Tories such as Benjamin Thompson, Oliver DeLancey and
Phillip Kearney was auctioned to the highest bidder after the treaty was
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endorsed. Georgia also chose to make a profit from the lands of listed
loyalists such as Sir James Wright and John Graham rather than uphold the
treaty. Andrew Allen of Pennsylvania was also unable to find restitution
for his property sold by Pennsylvania despite treaty stipulations.72
In contrast, Article VI protected against future confiscations or
punishment of an individual for their actions during the war, "no person
shall suffer any future loss.. .either in person, liberty or property for their
actions during the present war." By definition then it covered loyalists
whose behaviour during the revolution had not been 'conspicuous' or
threatening enough to banish or proscribe them. But it did govern
individuals whose allegiance to America was in question and who were
therefore vulnerable to retroactive retribution: the internal exiles of this
chapter. The American interpretation of Articles V and VI is particularly
instructive for determining whether loyalists who chose to stay in the
United States were understood to be protected by their status in the treaty.
Alexander Hamilton's debate over the issue of loyalist identity and
allegiance in A Letter from Phocion serves as microcosm of the debate and
helps to to clarify the opinion in New York. Benjamin Rush's treatise on
the situation in Philadelphia will illuminate similar tensions between the
legal status of loyalists and their treatment in the community.
A Letter from Phocion published in 1784 addressed "The
Considerate Citizens of New York on the Politics of the Day."73 Hamilton
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adopted the persona of Phocion, "The Good" Greek statesmen who
advocated honesty and fairness as the lynchpins of civic virtue.74 The
persona was relevant for this address to the citizens of New York, the
"harshest" state for loyalist punishment. In the letter, Hamilton encouraged
his fellow citizens to adopt a conciliatory and forgiving attitude to
remaining and returning loyalists. Indeed, the fact Hamilton wrote the
letter at all suggests that New Yorkers were not honoring Article V and VI
of the Treaty of Paris, which again highlights the disparity between the
loyalists' legal status and their social acceptance. Hamilton based his
argument on three main points: the importance of adhering to international
law, of honoring the ideology of the revolution and maintaining a healthy
domestic economy. This last point is particularly interesting as the case
studies discussed in the next section suggest that those Loyalists who were
permitted to stay or return were able to based on their economic viability.
Hamilton counselled New Yorkers to remember independence was
fought for "legal liberty" against tyranny and thus, illegal acts of
retribution against loyalists were inherently anti-revolutionary.75 By
confiscating property or refusing to return previously confiscated land,
Americans were tyrannizing individuals and subverting the loyalists'
liberty that was conferred to them in law. Hamilton clearly regarded the
Treaty of Paris as the definitive legal document defining and protecting
loyalist identity and rights. This fed neatly in to Hamilton's strongest
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argument for loyalists reintegration based on international law. In
Hamilton's view the law worked on two levels: the first was dictated by
natural law and the second by the Law of Nations and the Treaty of Paris
in particular.76 Accordingly, property confiscations were totally illegal in
Hamilton's understanding and failure to uphold the treaty specifications
damaged America' international reputation. For Hamilton, the treaty
defined the legal status of the loyalists. Honoring the treaty was essential
in gaining respect as an independent nation and in retaining moral
superiority over Britain. It is a brilliantly composed piece, designed to
provoke a sense of guilt but also the desire to redeem; "it remains for us to
justify the revolution by its fruits.. .Let those in whose hands it is placed
pause for a moment and contemplate with an eye for reverence, the vast
trust committed to them."77 Hamilton obviously regarded the Treaty of
Paris as the definitive answer to loyalist legal identity, yet Isaac Ledyard a
physician and health officer for the Port of New York disputed Hamilton's
position. Their public discourse printed in the press at the time highlights
the tension over the legal status of the loyalists in the aftermath of
independence.
This debate fore grounded the question of how the new republic
would classify loyalists. Crucially, the crux of the debate was not whether
the treaty governed the loyalists but if they were in fact American citizens.
Hamilton and Isaac Ledyard using the pseudonym "Mentor," engaged in a
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heated debate over whether loyalists were considered "aliens," or "disloyal
citizens" in American law.78 The 'war of words' illustrates the divided
opinion in New York and the intensity of feeling over the question of
loyalist citizenship. Hamilton favored the latter interpretation, arguing that
individuals covered by both Article V and VI were American citizens, "All
inhabitants who were subjects under the former government, and who did
not withraw themselves upon the change which took place [July 4 1776]
were to be considered citizens, owing allegiance to the new
government."79 In Hamilton's understanding, article V referred to
American citizens because anyone whose property was confiscated was
guilty of treason of one level or another. Hamilton asserted this meant by
definition they were "disloyal citizens" not "aliens" because one cannot,
he suggested be guilty of treason against a government you don't owe
on

allegiance to. Indeed, in Hamilton's view the fact that loyalists were
charged with treason for supporting the British attests to their status as
citizens of America rather than illegal aliens.
In contrast, Ledyard asserted the Treaty of Paris applied only to
those Loyalists who left during the war and did neither govern nor protect
loyalists who remained, "But I can find nowhere.. .that any of the three
classes may dwell among us, and enjoy the immunities and privileges of
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citizens."81 For Ledyard "real British subjects" as article V addressed,
were those whose allegiance to the King was so strong they left or were
forced to leave America. Ledyard focused most of his energy on refuting
Hamilton's suggestion that Loyalists would be instrumental in developing
American trade and commerce. He rejected the notion that "by removing
these people we remove a great part of the gold and silver from this state,"
as he argued "money is a conveniency, not an article of trade, wherever
trade centers, money will." Ledyard's emphasis on the commercial
argument suggests one of two things. Either New Yorkers were more
concerned about the presence of Loyalists in trade networks than their
legal status or it simply reflects his own area of expertise as an officer at
the Port of New York.
The question of why the qualification for American citizenship was
so crucial, is easier to understand given the observations of Morris
Birkbeck, who recorded his travels through North America in 1818.
Birkbeck noted that the highest compliment a man could be paid was to be
called a "good citizen." It was a phrase that carried with it connotations of
virtue and morality, and seems, at least in Birkbeck's observations to have
been widely known and used.82 Moreover, it was not simply a curious
traveller's exaggeration, nor was it confined to the early nineteenth
century. The question of what it meant to be a citizen in the Early Republic
was on many American minds in the inchoate decades immediately
81
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following the Peace of Paris. George Washington's personal sacrifices for
the sake of the public good were promoted as the epitome of civic virtue.
Benjamin Rush counselled fellow Philadelphians to aspire to the virtuous
qualities of hard work, frugality and dependability.84 In fact, the concept of
American citizenship quickly became synonymous with the personal
qualities of honor and courage; a man earned his citizenship by living up
to these ideals.85
In this context, the status of citizenship for those individuals who
had sided with the Crown was thus an ambiguous and vulnerable playing
field. The debate over the proposed repeal of the Test Act in Pennsylvania
further illuminates the complexity of Loyalists legal and social identity in
the new republic. In 1784, the Pennsylvania legislature reasserted its
loyalty oath from 1777, which specified that no one who had shown
allegiance to the King in the "late war" was qualified to vote or hold
office.86 Moreover, the act proposed that all male inhabitants who had
failed or 'not had the opportunity' to assert their loyalty since 1777 were
now required to do so through the authority of a Justice of the Peace. The
language of the oath reflects the intensity of the fear and resentment
Pennsylvanians still felt for those who had been loyal to the crown; Oath
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takers first had to "renounce and refuse all allegiance to King George the
Third" before stating (on oath) they had never assisted the British cause
87

against American independence after the Declaration in 1776. The
debates in the chamber over the wording of this section, illustrates the
divided opinion about reconciliation with loyalists. Newspapers reported
that the issue was of such importance to the people that, "vast numbers
filled the gallery.. .and many were obliged to return home, disappointed of
places."88
Benjamin Rush addressed the assembly at length on the issue,
counselling the legislature to repeal the act entirely in order to be a true,
liberty-loving republic.89 His eloquence was to no avail however as fear
and resentment won out over reconciliation; the proposal to erase the
explicit renunciation of allegiance to the King was rejected and the
reinforcement of the Test Act was supported two to one.90 Maryland also
passed a similar reinforcement of the Test Act in the format of an oath of
allegiance.91 Significantly, the act reinforced the notion of treason and
declared that any individual convicted of treason, or who had "joined,
aided, abetted.. .or in any way countenanced the Savages in their
depredations against the United States," was not eligible to undertake the
7
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oath of allegiance and gain citizenship. In theory, the new republic allowed
only Tories whose role in the war had been minimal to redeem themselves
by taking the oath and gaining citizenship.
In addition to the debates at the legislative level, local studies
reveal that a disparity existed between the legal qualifications for
citizenship proscribed at the state and national level compared to the
regulation of naturalization by individual towns and communities.

In

Connecticut for example, towns like Fairfield and Norwalk adopted strict
regulations against allowing loyalists to return which was at odds with
both the state policy of forgiveness and the stipulations of the Treaty of
Paris.93 John Adam's, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay even wrote a public
letter to the town criticizing their harsh treatment of remaining and
returning loyalists. The letter was a direct response to the Committee
established in New Haven a month earlier, which 'tried' each loyalist
application for repatriation. The Committees actions echoed the days of
loyalty oath and test acts.94 Further north in Massachusetts in 1784,
former loyalists Samuel Stearns and Archibald McNeill were arrested and
imprisoned for three years when they tried to return to their home state
despite state legislation advocating reintegration.95 In addition, the more
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informal regulation by communities, still worked to exclude or force out
their undesirables through persistent discrimination.
The transition from the Test Laws to the first Naturalization Act in
1787 made such disparities less prevalent. Just as the Test Act
standardized identification and punishment for treason the Naturalization
Act re-made the Test Act to suit the needs of the new republic.

The

protracted Congressional debates over requirements for naturalization
throughout the 1780s, helps explain the support in Maryland and
Pennsylvania for continuance of the Test Act. As suggested at the outset of
the chapter the principle of an oath of allegiance and requirements to
explicitly renounce allegiance to the British King that developed during
the Revolution found new life in the Naturalization Laws of 1787 and
1790.98 The concerns raised in Congress during the debates that lasted
over four years reflected the anxieties learned because of the civil war
dimension of the Revolution. For example, the question of 'interstatecitizenship' worried many representatives; would individuals be permitted
to apply for citizenship in different states at the same time? Might
individuals be allowed to apply to a different state for citizenship if denied
it in others? The presence and actions of Loyalists in the war instigated
these questions and made universal requirements for citizenship
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necessary." For example, Richard Smith a proscribed loyalist in
Massachusetts who failed the Test Act applied for and was awarded
citizenship in Connecticut in January 1783.100
In addition, these examples illustrate in microcosm the larger issue
of state versus national supremacy; as James Madison mused in The
Federalist interstate citizenship meant, "very improper power would still
be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other state."101
Issues such as property ownership, office holding and demands for a 'good
moral character' weighed heavy in the deliberations and again reflected
the unease caused by the internal enemies. Property was used against the
loyalists as a method of punishment and dissuasion in the war, which
explains its focus of power and status in the Naturalization debates; could
'aliens' become citizens without owning property? Interestingly, Congress
voted in the negative but still required a two-year residency before
applying for citizenship as well as a formal oath of allegiance to "satisfy
the court of their good character."102 In fact, as the Loyalists who stayed
in America were in fact citizens rather than aliens before the law they did
not have to go through the process of formal naturalization. However, the
ambiguity of the stipulations, compounded by the length of time it took to
become law meant those loyalists who chose to stay in the United States
were susceptible to informal regulation of citizenship by their local
Cases in which loyalists were denied citizenship in one state but accredited with it in another made
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100
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communities. In this transition period from colony to republic, Americans
developed a cultural meaning of citizenship based on virtue and
usefulness.
Moreover, attention to the transition from the Test Acts to
Naturalization illuminates what legal citizenship meant in the political
culture of the early republic. American citizens disagreed about the value
in reasserting the Test Act. Some regarded it as a valid and necessary
regulation, whereas others advocated its immediate repeal in the interests
of honoring republican principles. Regardless, communities acknowledged
that denial of the right to vote or hold office was effectively the denial of
citizenship. Indeed, as Rogers Smith has shown "citizenship was
something more than mere inhabitancy," it required a sense of belonging
to a "common sovereignty" and exercising ones membership through
voting and office holding.

Loyalists who remained in the United States

then occupied the ambiguous ground of legal citizens without voting rights
or office holding privileges. As a result, they found alternate ways to
demonstrate their civic virtue.
* * *

Tench Coxe exemplifies the conundrum that former loyalists faced.
On paper, Coxe exuded all the qualities of the ideal American citizen; he
was a man blessed with business acumen, working his way from the
counting house floor to Alexander Hamilton's Treasury department within
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half a decade.104 He also found time to exercise a social conscience, sitting
simultaneously on the boards of the Philadelphia Abolition Society and the
"Philadelphia Society for alleviating the miseries of public prisons."105
The eminent historian of American economic thought, Joseph Dorfman
has gone so far to describe Coxe as the "Defoe of America."1 6 More
recently, scholars have portrayed Coxe as the "Judas" of the "Financial
Founding Fathers."107
Regardless, there is more at work here than simply contested
historiography. The experience of Tench Coxe and other loyalists who
chose potential exile within the United States, rather than become refugees
outside it, shed new light on the meaning of American citizenship in the
new republic. Coxes' fellow Philadelphians welcomed his self-conscious
effort to become (in his own words) a "good American" through hard
work and innovation. However, their acceptance of his role in the
economic sphere did not translate into the realm of politics. Contemporary
responses to his foray into the political world illustrate the limit of his
colleagues' toleration. Coxe could be a useful citizen in the economic
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world but could not presume to proscribe for the nation in the political
realm.

,08

Coxe's Tory bent was well known; during the war, he spent time in
Loyalist safe havens in New York and New Jersey only to return to his
native Philadelphia with British troops in 1777 perceiving his return as a
"vindication of his loyalty to the English."109 As the law dictated, the local
Committee on Safety accused Coxe of treason for his actions. However,
through family connections to the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania and
personal friendships with notable citizens such as Benjamin Rush and
Thomas Mckean Coxe managed to convince the legislature of his
commitment to the American cause by taking the oath of allegiance. In
doing so, he avoided property confiscation and banishment. Coxe's
experience supports Hyman's conclusion that the oath was merely an
official token of recognition rather than the definitive measure of
reliability. However, Coxe held onto the oaths until his death, which
suggests the oaths' legal and perhaps symbolic importance.110 It was not
simply a verbal ceremony but a legal document binding Coxe's loyalty to
the independent states. This, together with his admission to family friend
and fellow loyalist William Tilghman that he was, "if permitted...likely to
become a good American" indicates Coxe's willingness to adapt to the
new regime.111 His actions suggest that his commitment although self
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interested, was very real which foregrounds the question of motive and
incentive. The idea of exile did not occur to Coxe because his business
networks and family connections tied him to North America. Exile simply
did not make good business sense. Moreover, his business connections and
commercial skills were also the reasons his contemporaries wanted him to
remain.
Reading the classified section of a Philadelphia newspaper in the
mid 1780s, the monopoly that Tench Coxe and his partner, Nalbro Frazier
enjoyed on the luxury and unusual goods market is marked. From their
storefront on Chestnut Street, Coxe and Frazier provided merchandise
ranging from whale oil to furniture cottons, Dutch laces to Satin wood,
Madeira Wine to selections of millenary items.

Coxe's business helped

fuel the new activity of shopping for luxury goods, which became a
popular and legitimate pastime in the new republic. In fact, many
historians classify this period as the "refining of American society", and
Coxe contributed to this shift."113 In addition to the sale of such a variety
of goods, Coxe and Frazier negotiated charter contracts for vessels, and
acted as agents for house lets and ship sales.114 They were incredibly
successful intermediaries in a depressed economy and in Jacob Cooke's
112
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estimation Coxe was the "ideal business ally in America."115 It seems
Coxe's economic usefulness allowed him to stay in America after 1783
despite his chequered past.
Coxe also played a pivotal role in the development of American
manufacturing. While on the board of the "Pennsylvania Society for the
Encouragement of Arts and Domestic Manufacturers," Coxe worked hard
to establish similar societies in other states and directed attempts to steal
English designs for textile machinery.116 Despite Coxe's positive role in
the Philadelphian and American economy, there remained lingering
distrust of his political ideology. In the fall of 1799 his Tory past came
back to haunt him when his fellow townsmen voted against his nomination
117

to the House of Representatives.

Coxe's public support for Thomas

McKean's campaign for Governor of Philadelphia in 1799 compromised
McKean's position, as Coxe's traitorous past was unearthed and used to
undermine the cause.118 Yet, at the same time as Coxe received such
slander in the newspapers he was also nominated chairman of a Committee
that raised funds to improve the road system between Philadelphia's
outlying counties to increase their population and prosperity.119 For Coxe,
his Tory past was forgotten on the commercial floor but reared its very
ugly head when he dared to cross the threshold into politics.
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In many respects, Coxe is an extreme example, and as he took the
oath of allegiance before the Treaty of Paris, he qualified for the full rights
of citizenship, which meant he could own land and exercised his voting
rights. The experience of Peter Van Schaak offers a very different, though
no less illuminating perspective on the reasons certain loyalists were
allowed to return and their function in the new republic. Born in New
York, Van Schaack adopted a policy of neutrality during the Revolution
and therefore refused to take the oath of allegiance to New York.120 In
accordance with the law he was then exiled to Boston and ultimately
banished to England under the Banishment Act of 1777.121 Despite his
traitorous record and exile in England for three years of the war, Van
Schaack was welcomed back to New York in August of 1785 with
seemingly no objections from his fellow natives.122 Crucially, however
Van Schaack and the three other loyalists whose citizenship was restored
by the state of New York in a ceremony in May 1784 still had to take an
oath of allegiance to the state.123 In addition, although New York
reinstated Van Schaack to the bar he had to start from a much lower
position than he had left, illustrating the need for him to earn or prove his
worthiness of citizenship. As a lawyer, an intellectual and a family man
New Yorkers forgave Van Schaack, but the principle of formal allegiance
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remained.124 The American loyalists who stayed in the United States and
those that returned from exile reminded Americans of treason's potential
primacy as a function of change in the new republic.
Attention to less conspicuous Tories also reinforces the observation
that loyalists who stayed in North America did so the basis of their
economic viability. In his study of loyalists in post-Independence
Connecticut, Oscar Zeichner found that the patriots' motivation for
allowing their internal enemies back into the community lay in the
opportunities they provided for wealth and trade for the town.

Rebecca

Starr uncovered similar financial reasons for loyalist rehabilitation on
Danfuskie Island.126 Significantly, Zeichner identified disparities between
the state legislation on "disloyal citizens" and the way individual towns
treated them. Fairfield, Connecticut for example prohibited its 'internal
enemies' from voting or holding office for seven years, but embraced the
contributions those same individuals made to improving Connecticut's
trade links and economic standing.127 David E. Maas uncovered similar
patterns in Massachusetts where Marblehead residents conveniently
forgave Thomas Robie's Tory past, welcoming the return of his family in
exchange for a competitive dry goods store.1281 argue that this trend was
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in fact widespread, and that former Tories like Tench Coxe were
welcomed back into the community based on their financial viability. In
addition, I suggest that former loyalists exercised their "volitional
allegiance," not through voting or office holding but through active
innovation in the economy.
Ex-loyalists played a pivotal role in generating debate about how the
economy would work in the new republic. The concept of the bank in the
early 1800s was problematic. In theory they were public enterprises, yet
they were privately funded and exclusively directed.129 The move towards
explicit private ownership of banks in 1780s created an environment in
which ex-loyalist merchants Archibald McCall, Benjamin Chew, Edward
Shippen and Samuel Pleasants challenged the monopoly of the Bank of
North America. ' ° These men proposed a Bank of Pennsylvania to create
a healthy competitive environment and thus a better service to
Philadelphians. They argued a second bank would solve the problem of
inflation caused by valueless paper money and negate the need to return to
the land bank system.

One supporter of the scheme likened the benefit

of a second bank to a topic many of its readers could relate to; he asked
plainly "whether a traveller was best served in a town that had two taverns
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or one," a rhetorical question he did not insult the reader by answering.132
Although the plan failed, it did force the Bank of America to amend its
structure slightly and limit its corporate existence to 14 years and its
capital to $2,000,000.133 While unsuccessful in their plan, these former
loyalists helped shape the economic structure of post-revolution
Pennsylvania, a positive influence that may explain why they were
permitted to stay despite their Tory past.
New Hampshire was equally perceptive in its choice of loyalists
allowed to stay. The mob in Portsmouth hounded John Stavers outside his
house in 1776 for his allegiance to the King. His monarchic affiliations
were "conspicuous" because his tavern was named the Earl of Halifax, his
brother Bartholomew voluntarily left for England during the war and he
was suspected of breaking the non-importation and consumption
agreement. As a result, the local mob enacted charivari on Stavers by
pelting his house with rocks and severely injuring his black slave.
However, Stavers was able to convince the town of his ability to adapt to
the new republic and crucially his usefulness in the economy of
Portsmouth. The visual change of his tavern from the Earl of Halifax to the
William Pitt Tavern in favour of a pro-American member of Parliament
went some way to satisfying the first requirement. In addition, he agreed to
sign an oath of allegiance to New Hampshire and thus the local Committee
decided he was innocent. Moreover, as Pitt Tavern continued to provide a
132
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social hub and economic center for the town, housing visiting dignitaries
such as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, the Portsmouth
community permitted Stavers to stay to help keep the Portsmouth
134

economy buoyant.
New Hampshire residents of Ipswich allowed loyalist Reuben
Kidder to remain after independence for similar reasons. According to
Lorenzo Sabine, Kidder was the "richest man in that town" and
contributed to the prosperity of the small town. Kidder's reintegration by
fellow residents was even more surprising because Kidder refused to
recognize the new government and did not take the oath of allegiance.
Crucially, although he did not exercise his political rights as a citizen to
vote or hold office, he did pay his taxes.135 Indeed his financial usefulness
was evident in 1791 when the New Hampshire General Court declared that
in contrast to the tax of 2 pence for acre for most Washington county
citizens, Kidder's land would be taxed "the sum of 15 pounds for the
purpose of repairing the public highways."136 Ipswich decided to overlook
Kidder's political obstinacy in exchange for the economic public good.
Given the uncertainty surrounding their status, the question of the
motives of those loyalists who stayed or very quickly returned to America
becomes a critical one. If they were neither fully enfranchised American
citizens, nor British subjects with protection by the Empire why did
loyalists wish to stay in North America amidst potential hostility and
134
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persistent confusion over their legal and national identity? Alan Taylor's
recent study of Upper Canada in this period further highlights the
importance of this question.137 Taylor demonstrated that Britain carved out
certain regions of Canada as an antidote to the perceived radical politics of
the former North American colonies.138 The agreement was based on the
availability of cheap land and agreement of low taxes in exchange for
passive political subjects. If this was indeed the case, does this suggest that
those 413,000 loyalists who chose to stay in the United States embraced
the principle of popular participation? Moreover, if the tax burden was so
much lighter in Upper Canada than in the post war United States, what
were the incentives to stay in the independent republic? The selections of
case studies above suggest that the economic opportunities in the new
republic were more important than the political system or allegiance.
Additionally, their practice of "volitional allegiance" belies the accepted
belief that the Loyalists were invalid both in and after the Revolution.
To explore this question further we look forward in the next
chapter to the merchant culture of the Early Republic and the role former
loyalists played in establishing American trade and commercial networks
on a competitive international footing.
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Chapter 2
Things Left Unsaid and Undone: Loyalists and the Quest for a
Commercial Treaty. 1783-1796

During the inchoate early days of the newly independent United
States, few issues plagued politicians, merchants, sailors and planters alike
more than America's commercial policy. South Carolinian, St. George
Tucker reflected the attitude of his generation best when he explained that
commerce was the "barometer of power," the real test of America's
political revolution. Economic historians John J. McCusker and Russell
Menard, shared a similar interpretation when they characterized commerce
as the "elixir" for any successful democracy.139 Whichever instrument they
chose, in the two decades after independence American politicians were
understandably keen to shift their focus from political negotiations to
economic considerations and in particular to expand the nation's
commercial interests.140
The question of trading policy with the British West Indies was a
crucial piece of the commercial puzzle. Analysis of this slice of policy
and activity can shed light on the larger issues of the period: Did America
qualify for British trade privileges after Independence? If not, how would
they re-establish trade with overseas markets? In this sense, the many
139
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facets of Anglo-American relations in the 1780s and 1790s involved not
only a battle for commercial dominance, but also the struggle for a sense
of national pride and identity. It replayed and reworked the ideological
battleground of the American Revolution, allowing Britain and America to
explore the dynamics of their new relationship. It was a dispute played in
the legislative assemblies of the West Indies, the British Isles and the
United States and by planters and merchants on the ground.
I suggest that the experience and actions of the loyalists in the
elusive search for a commercial agreement with Great Britain needs
further attention. As refugees in the West Indies and as merchants in
America the loyalists contributed to this effort by lobbying the British
Parliament and subverting British imperial trade restrictions. In so doing,
they played a significant role in trying to alleviate the prohibitions
stipulated in the Treaty of Paris (1783) and in Jays Treaty (1796). By
refocusing attention onto a select group of historical actors within a
particular aspect of the larger picture of commercial relations, historians
can gain a better understanding of the influence loyalists had on British
policy after independence.141 They were not simply passive subjects nor
disinterested refugees but proactive members of a changing commercial
community. In addition, this chapter demonstrates how two Loyalist exiles
living in London also helped shape British commercial policy. By 'adding'
loyalists to the narrative in this way, this study helps to reveal the links
141
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between the Early Republic and those sections of the British Atlantic like
the West Indies that remained in the colonial period. Tracing merchant
loyalists from the Revolution into the national period provides anchors to
illuminate these links and continuities. In addition, it illustrates Jack P.
Greene's argument that the peripheries of an empire have as great an
influence on the dynamics of that empire as its' center. 14
Attention to the West Indies as a critical component to
understanding the British Empire and the American Revolution has
become rather de rigueur of late. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy's book,
An Empire Divided has paved the way for acknowledging that Britain
possessed 26 colonies in North America, rather than the traditional
conception of 13.143 By placing the West Indies in a more central position
in analysis of the Revolution, it becomes apparent that any study of the
American political economy after independence must also include those
islands. This study will use O'Shaughnessy's classification of the 'West
Indies' or the British Caribbean encompassing Jamaica, Barbados,
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent,
Tortola and Tobago.'

The largest concentrations of loyalist refugees

were in Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica and St. Kitts and that is where the
merchants predominantly directed their trade.145
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At the Treaty of Paris (1783) the American delegates foregrounded
the question of American trade with the West Indies. John Adams best
represented the American position when he argued that the "commerce of
the West Indian Islands is part of our American system of commerce. They
can neither do without us nor we without them."146 In fact, Charles W.
Toth ably demonstrates that the American representatives believed the
United States had a natural right to trade with the West Indies. Writing
almost forty years after the deliberations Henry Bliss remarked that, "the
Americans seem always to have considered the West Indian trade as theirs
of right.. .which they apparently interpret as the law of nature and of
nations."147 The negotiations for the Treaty of Amity, Navigation and
Commerce (Jays Treaty) thirteen years later raised similar issues. In 1783,
the American delegates broached the subject of West Indian trade as early
as day two of the negotiations. In 1796, the opening of the West Indian
ports to American vessels was one of only two 'non-negotiable' clauses
for the American delegation. Direct comparison between the two treaties
makes the American quest for international trade privileges throughout the
1780s and the early 1790s manifest. Because the same issues persisted
over the thirteen-year period it is evident the Americans were ultimately
disappointed.
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This chapter will focus on the vocal objections to these restrictions
from the West Indies and the North American mainland. It will trace the
American pursuit of better privileges from the Treaty of Paris (1783) to
Jays Treaty (1796) and conclude that although they were unsuccessful in
each regard the efforts to secure more trading rights supports
characterization of the period as a replay of the Revolution. In the light of
this, it is important to stress that most scholars agree that the British
embargo on American shipping did not cause a significant downturn in
either the American or the West Indian economy. Andrew Jackson
O'Shaughnessy suggests the annual average profit of 8.5 % was in keeping
148

with the 10% average for the century.

Michael Craton goes further to

propose 1786 and 1787 were the most prosperous years in the eighteenth
century for the British Caribbean.149 In the history of the British-American
economy, John J. McCusker and Russell Menard confirm that the
economic impact of the American Revolution on America was "not half so
radical as the political changes" and characterize the period for both
America and the West Indies as one of 'economic pause' rather than a
significant downturn.150 If the real economic effects of the restrictions
were not quite as drastic as contemporary responses suggest, attention to
the ideological impact of the prohibitions becomes increasingly important
and suggests the subversions of the regulations by West Indian and
O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 239.
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American merchants alike was prompted as much by national pride as
national survival.
***

In order to appreciate fully the importance of the West Indies in the
economic and ideological replay of the American Revolution it is
imperative to recognize the significance of the Navigation Acts of 16511673. In this period, the Acts worked as the lynchpin of Britain's
commercial Empire, privileging British goods and British ships over
foreign trade.151 They served the dual purpose of achieving commercial
monopoly while fostering a sense of belonging and community to the
empire. As John Morgan suggested in 1766, the Acts created such wealth
for the Empire that they encouraged a "spirit of industry among her
inhabitants."152 McCusker and Menard illustrated the Acts achieved this
sense of community because they benefited, "Philadelphia merchants as
well as the merchants of Plymouth, sailors from New York as well as
sailors from Old York."153 The real strength of the Acts however, lay in
their emphasis on the carrying trade. It was not simply privileging British
goods over foreign ones that was valuable, but favoring British ships over
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foreign vessels. This, according to Benjamin Franklin meant Britain
owned the seas and could therefore, "maintain... the safety of navigation in
it, [and] keep it clear of pirates," which as a result allowed Britain to
enforce some, "toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part of
[her] dominion."154 Ownership of the sea secured greater international
power and generated more income from the duties collected from the
goods carried. As a result, McCusker and Menard argue, "the inflow of
gold and silver increased."155 Indeed, the American pursuit of trade rights
to the West Indies was due in large part to the profitability established in
that trade before the Revolution.
The economic benefits of mercantilism explain the American
delegates' commitment to a commercial trade clause at the treaty
negotiations in Paris. Before the Revolution the West Indies absorbed the
export trade from North America's four key ports: Boston, Philadelphia,
New York and Newport. The trade was extremely lucrative because each
shipment carried a variety of goods. For example, a cargo could carry
oysters and bricks, horses and stones all in one consignment. In addition,
business was fraternal and solidly established, as firms in each location
would often work in partnership by sharing vessels and business.156 These
relationships exemplified the empire's mercantilist policy. The British
prohibition of American trade with the West Indies during the Revolution
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was therefore a method of punishment for rebellion and an act of coercion
to return to imperial control. The refusal of the Fox and North
administration in Britain to back down at the Treaty of Paris meant that the
British continued to treat American ships as foreign vessels in the West
Indian trade.157 From the British perspective, extending trading privileges
to America was out of the question. It flouted the concept of mercantilism
and therefore undermined Britain's naval and commercial ascendancy. As
a result, the Treaty of Paris only stipulated American's right to fish in
Newfoundland and the Gulf of St Lawrence. It did not mention any trading
privileges with any part of the British Empire.158 In practice, this meant
American ships were prohibited from trading with the West Indies and
could only exchange goods with the islands via British owned vessels.
Wallace Brown's thorough study of the American loyalists sheds
light on their potential importance in the colonial trade between North
America and the West Indies. Brown asserts that most loyalists had a
"commercial tendency."159 In fact, he concludes, "Everywhere the
commercial element - merchants, shopkeepers, artisans.. .contributed a
greater percentage to the ranks of loyalists."160 More specifically, in
Virginia, 64% of Loyalists were merchants by trade. This majority
becomes even clearer in the reports of the Virginia Merchants Association.
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In 1763, the Association had 72 members of which only 4 ultimately
supported the rebellion against Britain.161 Figures from the New York
Chamber of Commerce reinforce Brown's idea of a "commercial
tendency." The New York Chamber of Commerce 104-member body
included 57 loyalists. Isaac Low, for example, a prominent loyalist, was
President of the board in 1782 before he failed the Test Act and was
proscribed and banished to England.162 David E. Maas' book The Return
of the Massachusetts Loyalists also finds merchants as the dominant
occupation within the loyalist classification. While the majority (71%) left
after the evacuation of Boston, 24 % remained behind.163 Indeed, Arthur
M. Schlesinger's study, The Colonial Merchants and the American
Revolution, argues that British trade restrictions implemented after 1763
did not adversely affect the merchant community, which meant few
merchants actively supported independence. This did not mean all
merchants were overwhelmingly loyal to the crown, but it does mean that
they were, "dragged along [to independence] unwillingly by the planter
aristocracy."164
Robert A. East's study of business relations through the
revolutionary period also suggests, "most merchants were loyalists, but

161

Brown, The Kings Friends, (Providence, Brown University Press, 1965) 181.
Brown, Good Americans, 231, Sabine, Biographical Sketches, II, 32-33.
163
Maas argues the totals don't add up to 100 "since there are some unknown factors." However, the
general sense that a significant proportion of merchant loyalists stayed in Boston is still useful. Mass,
Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists, 179.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchant and the American Revolution, (New York, Facsimile
Library, 1939) 134, 197-199, 236, 364, passim.
162

56
most were not exiled, and the majority even escaped confiscation."

The

experience of Isaac and Carpenter Wharton, merchants in Philadelphia
help illuminate East's observation. They were first attainted with treason
for illicit trade with the British but the charges were ultimately dropped
and they were released.166 Wallace Brown also cites several of
Pennsylvania's leading merchant families as examples of East's assertion.
According to Brown, the Morrises, Willings,' Pembertons' and Whartons'
all remained in the United States.167 Lorenzo Sabine reinforces the
Pemberton's experiences insofar as a James Pemberton of Philadelphia
was "universally respected" and died in Philadelphia in 1809.
Unfortunately, Sabine does not explicitly describe him as a merchant and
none of the other family names are listed. In fact, although the secondary
literature suggests many loyalist merchants continued to work and trade in
the early national period there are no significant leads in the primary
material.169 The secondary material does suggest that because the majority
of loyalists were merchants those that stayed in America had a vested
interest in securing the best possible trade privileges.
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Interestingly, two very different types of loyalists, probably
classified as "real British subjects" according to the criteria in chapter one,
worked against extending those much sought after concessions.
Traditionally Britain's decision to pursue the principle of mercantilistism
after 1783 is attributed to Lord Sheffield. Sheffield's Observations on the
Commerce of the American States was published in 1784 and advocated
enforcement of the navigation acts to weaken the newly independent
states.170 More recently, John Crowley places William Knox in a more
influential role.171 A loyalist from Georgia, Knox was one of the few
refugees to receive a government post in England.172 Born in Ireland, he
worked as an official in Georgia for five years and remained a landholder
throughout the revolutionary period.173 His failure of the Test Act
determined his status as a Loyalist as well as his presence in Lorenzo
Sabine's Biographical Sketches.11 Knox earned his influential role under
Lord North in the American Department of the Colonial Secretary's
cabinet. The Department was responsible for strengthening London's
control of colonial policy which, before the Revolution they did through
such measures as the Sugar Act 1764, Currency Act 1764 and the
infamous Stamp Act in 1765.175 In an open letter dated 1765 Knox
articulated the Department's justification for the Stamp Act by
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highlighting Parliamentary sovereignty in all matters. First, he noted the
absence in colonial charters for explicit exemption from taxation.
Secondly, he contended that Parliament's right to tax was the same as its
right to confiscate property (which was accepted as legitimate), and he
argued finally that economic regulations by Parliament were the reason for
the colonies' prosperity and therefore ought to continue.

Given Knox's

emphasis on Parliament's sovereignty, it is unsurprising that he continued
to assert Britain's dominance through commercial legislation after the
peace treaty of 1783. To achieve this, Knox recommended that American
vessels be prohibited from direct trade with the British West Indies, and as
a result, American goods to the Islands had to be transported in British
vessels.177
In some respects, Britain's persistence with mercantilist principles
was a reflection of the value of West Indian trade. Indeed, the importance
of the West Indies for the prosperity of the British Empire and the success
of the carrying trade in particular, was evident long before the American
Revolution. Because of their climate, the fertility of the soil, and the
wealth of slave labor, the West Indies provided the Empire with sugar, one
of its most lucrative commodities. Herbert Bell asserts that Britain had
sixty million pounds invested in the Islands and three quarters of its
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revenue derived from those sugar rich colonies.

Indeed, the British

ministry believed, "His Majesty's Dominions in the West Indies" were
"the principle source of the national opulence."179 In return, the metropole
treated the West Indies with a degree of bias, offering exemptions from
several imperial taxes.180 Naturally, any post-war commercial policy
needed to favor Britain in the carrying of trade to and from the West Indies
in order to ensure that Britain would continue to benefit from the islands'
profitability.
Enforcement of the Navigation Acts after the Treaty of Paris was
lot

also a way of exerting ideological control over the independent states.
Because the Acts emphasized the carrying trade over the commercial, it
was not American goods that were discriminated against but American
vessels. The only restricted American products were beef, pork and fish.
The real intention of the policy to monopolize the carrying trade ensured
British ships continued to dominate the sea. This enabled a replay of the
struggle for ascendancy acted out in the Revolution to take place in the
commercial arena throughout the 1780s and 1790s.
British ministers praised William Knox for the policy he created.
The response in Britain to the policy was characterized by Edward Gibbon
who praised its author as the 'defender if not the savior of the navigation
178
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acts."

George Chalmers hoped the retention of the Navigation Acts

would succeed in 'inconveniencing,' the independent states and Edward
Ball believed it was a just punishment to treat the rebels as disobedient
children.183 As British Consul in America for the Middle States, Phineas
Bond echoed the British response in America. He emphasized the
importance of British commercial control, making it synonymous with
imperial power and believed a reduction in the former as a sign of
weakness of the Empire.184 The integration of the carrying trade with
notions of national and ideological power exacerbated the commercial
conflict between Britain and the newly independent United States.
This is not to suggest that the policy arrived at was reached
smoothly. American trade rights divided parties on both sides of the
Atlantic and laid bare the ideological differences caused by the
Revolution. There were several factions within the British ministry, some
of whom advocated no restrictions on American trade, and often more
conservative sections, which Knox's proposals represented. Lord
Shelburne suggested treating American vessels like British ones, but
Charles Fox and many others rejected such a proposal as nonsense; in
order to recognize American independence Britain must treat her like a
foreign nation.185 They did all agree, however, on the crucial distinction
between the commercial and the carrying trade. The key point of
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contention between British ministers was not in allowing the trade of
American goods, but what vessels were used.

By monopolizing the

carrying trade in this way, Britain maintained its naval strength and also
limited defection of sailors to the US navy. The persistence of this policy
justifies classification of the 1780s as an ideological battleground of
lingering revolutionary disputes.
In America, the question of West Indian trade exacerbated the
divisions between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. Just as
the issue of the legal identity of loyalists aggravated political disputes in
the new republic, so too the West Indian trade caused a rift between the
political parties.187 In general, Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton
advocated a conciliatory approach to commercial affairs.

Hamilton and

his supporters did not want to alienate or aggravate Britain as they feared
America was too dependant on her trade links. Instead, they sought to
enact "favourable terms of trade with Britain [in order to] cultivate the
trade of Anglo-American agents."189
In contrast, soon to be Democratic-Republicans Madison and
Jefferson advocated a more aggressive policy in which the U.S. coerced
foreign nations into commercial treaties. Jefferson shared Madison's fiscal
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approach and emphasized the importance of navigation. In fact, Jefferson
demonstrated acute understanding of the purpose of the Navigation Acts as
he "measured the success of American policy by the extent that American
shipping displaced British."190 Jefferson knew America's commercial
policy must emphasize using American ships for the carrying trade rather
than promoting American produce in order to compete with Britain.
Another Loyalist in London, George Chalmers ensured that
commercial terms between Britain and America would not be equal.191
The Committee on Trade, established in March 1784 worked hard to put
Knox's recommendations into practice and Chalmers in particular
reinforced the basic principles on which the regulations were founded.
George Chalmers was born in Scotland but immigrated to Maryland after
graduating from Kings College in Aberdeen. During the revolution, his
allegiance to the Crown forced his return to Britain where along with
Knox, he was one of the more fortunate loyalists to receive a government
post in London.192 He has left behind a rich array of writings that reveal
how seriously he took his work and how reflective he was on matters of
political concern. In his lengthy 'Opinion' on the impact of American
independence on Britain's commercial policy, Chalmers exemplifies the
connection between commercial policy and national identity. In this twohundred-page thought piece, Chalmers justified Britain's restriction on
America's commercial privileges by utilizing the legal construct of
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192
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American citizenship. He argued that because Americans were no longer
British subjects and were foreign in fact, especially, "in some important
points of our naval policy, the American Citizens are declared to be
aliens," and thus denied commercial privileges.193 The weight placed on
this argument is evident from its position at the commencement of the
piece and the sheer length of the discussion. Moreover, Chalmers'
classification of Americans as "aliens" to Britain reinforces the intensity
and persistence of the debate over legal identities in the fall out of the war.
Interestingly, Chalmers believed that British subjects who retained
commercial privileges and American citizens who were classified as aliens
divided America.194 If this was indeed the case, loyalist merchants would
have been a very useful asset to the newly independent United States,
since they would qualify for the trade privileges to the British colonies.
However, it does not seem possible, given the insistence on loyalty oaths
and the practice of "volitional allegiance," that the new republic would
allow loyalists to operate as British subjects in the new republic.
Regardless, Chalmers' piece highlights the ideological dimensions to the
dispute. This was not simply about economic ascendancy but national
identity and imperial ascendancy. For instance, the Committee sought to
maintain the mercantilist policy of Britain's Empire by substituting
foodstuffs usually supplied to the West Indies from the United States with
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goods from Canada and Nova Scotia. They sought to practice traditional
mercantilist policy by substituting Canada for North America even though
Canada simply did not have the internal resources nor established
industries to supply the West Indies.195
The examples of Knox and Chalmers suggest a significant, if
modest, role was played in shaping British policy by those classified as
loyalists. 1% This challenges Charles Ritcheson's assertion that the
loyalists were neither numerous nor coherently organized enough to
influence British policy towards America after independence. Ritcheson
based his interpretation on the fact Knox and Chalmers were not 'loyal'
enough to be classified as loyalist. Ritcheson asserted that Knox's status as
an absentee landlord and Chalmers' stay in the US was too short and
temporary to classify them as "loyalists."197 In practice, such narrow
definitions are not particularly helpful or necessary. Both Knox and
Chalmers were legally banished from the United States for their loyalty
and are listed in Lorenzo Sabine's Biographical Sketches.198 If they were
perceived as loyalists by contemporaries this seems evidence enough of
their 'legitimate' loyalist identity. Indeed, their actions after independence
attest to their commitment to one of the many principles of loyalism;
working within and for the Empire to improve it for all members. In this
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sense they were perhaps "real British subjects" whereas the loyalists in
chapter one were "disloyal citizens." These comparisons elucidate the
standard notion that loyalism was not a unified nor coherent movement in
North America.199 Mary Beth Norton's magnum opus, The BritishAmericans also challenges Ritcheson's analysis. She maintains that the
Associated Loyalists in London were proactive and a viable lobbying
force. She especially notes their significant achievement by establishing
the American Claims Commission and bringing about the downfall of the
Shelburne administration.200
Knox and Chalmers' represent the experience of "real British
subjects" whose support of the Crown was so conspicuous they were
forced to leave America. As the above discussion illustrates this did not
inhibit their continued relationship with America and perhaps even best
equipped them for shaping British imperial policy. However, as chapter
one demonstrated, the classification of the term 'loyalist' was contested
both during and after the Revolution. The debate over "real British
subjects" versus "disloyal citizens" also applied to those loyalists who
were merchants before and throughout the Revolution.
The one individual who can clarify the transition between loyalist
merchants before and after the Revolution is Tench Coxe. Born into a
family of merchants in Philadelphia his father, William Coxe was a
prominent businessman who cultivated personal and professional
The nature of loyalism is discussed in the introduction. All the key monographs on the Loyalists agree
that it was neither a unified nor cohesive ideology or movement.
200
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relationships with other successful merchant families in the city. Most
notable were the Tilghman's, the Allen's and Chew families who were
prominent merchants in the city who also favored the Crown over
Independence.201 In 1775, Tench Coxe joined his father's firm, Coxe and
Furman as a junior partner despite the economic impact of the British
restrictions. In December of 1776, Coxe was forced to leave the city due to
"violence and threats of a body of armed men."202 He resumed business in
New York though through his father's connections and even established
networks of his own with leading merchants in New York such as Isaac
Low and Edward Goold. On his return to Philadelphia with the British
troops in September 1777 Coxe quickly resumed trading and set up his
own firm, Coxe and Frazier.203
Coxe bears out Wallace Brown's findings that most merchant
loyalists who chose to stay in the United States after independence based
themselves in Pennsylvania.204 This is significant in terms of the American
- West Indian trade as Philadelphia was the key port of connection and
departure. Indeed, Alice B. Keith's study of British restrictions on
American-West Indian trade confirms that the majority of trade to and
from the West Indies from 1784-1800 came from the Middle Atlantic
States. 205 In 1794, the merchants of Philadelphia organized a formal
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Committee to represent their interests to the Secretary of State.

The

Committee responded to British seizure of American ships in the West
Indies, which compromised their trade links with both the French and
British Islands.207 Committee members compiled the evidence from all
cases of seizure of American ships in "the British Islands, the West Indies
and [especially] Bermuda, [and] the Bahamas." John Jay then used this
information as advantage to force a favorable commercial treaty with
Great Britain in 1796. Although Jay was largely unsuccessful, Brown and
Keith's findings illuminate the force of the merchant class in Philadelphia
and touch on the importance of the West Indian trade for American
merchants.
Most surprisingly, a loyalist named Joseph Shoemaker was one of
the five members of this small select committee, which contributed to the
American policy at the treaty in 1796. Shoemaker was a native of
Pennsylvania who aligned himself with the rebels until the Declaration of
Independence. After switching allegiance, he accepted the command of a
privateer ship and "commenced depredations on his former political
friends."208 Governed by law of treason defined during the Revolution,
Shoemaker was arrested for treason but because he surrendered he was
released without charge. The fact that such a "conspicuous" Tory was
206
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allowed to sit on an important committee in 1794 illustrates the extent of
reintegration by that time and also strengthens the assertion that
individuals who were permitted to stay brought with them economic
viability.
***

Loyalists also contributed to shaping Britain and America's
commercial relationship from the vantage point of exile in the West Indies.
Estimates suggest that around 5,500 loyalists fled to the Islands between
1782-1785, most of whom came from the Carolinas and Georgia. Largely
attracted by the promise of free land, a fertile climate and military
protection the refugees flocked to the commercial centers of Jamaica and
the Bahamas.

Indeed, in Nassau alone loyalist refugees increased the

merchant population from 3 to 26 and doubled the total white population
in the Bahamas.210 Printed first hand accounts and newspaper reports of
the demographics and trade movements disseminated knowledge of the
Islands' fertility. Oswell Eve, a Captain and, in historian Catherine Crary's
estimation, a "shipping merchant of importance," wrote at length in 1784
to his loyalist friend Daniel Coxe of New Jersey on the suitability of Cat
Island as a loyalist haven. Eve sought to undue the traditional perception
of the island in the Bahamas as only a fit "Asylum for Pirates and
Wreckers and those fond of a marine way of living." He acknowledged the
appearance of the landscape was not appealing but emphasized the
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potential for growing cotton when cultivated properly. He also cited the
wealth of a retired Pennsylvanian gentleman for proof of the islands'
prospects and envisaged the perfect spot for a town and Government
"some future day." 2 " In writing to Daniel Coxe who was working for his
brother's merchant trading firm in Philadelphia, Eve's advertisement was
probably passed on through informal networks of kin and trade. Indeed,
the influx of New York loyalists to Great Abaco Island and Cat Island may
be attributed in part to Eve's reports.212
The South Carolinian press also promoted relocation to the West
Indies as an attractive option to proscribed loyalists. Newspapers
published bulletins from Nassau announcing the arrival of provisions
specifically for the American loyalists.213 A second ship of provisions
under Captain Fandall carrying provisions explicitly for American
loyalists was reported much further north in the Connecticut Journal.214
Such bulletins were factual rather than emotional but still added to the
image of the West Indies as a safe asylum. In Jamaica, the prospects for
loyalist exiles were good as they were exempt from taxation, were under
no obligation to perform public service duties (aside from militia service)
and were granted tracts of land free of charge.215 Many of the loyalist
refugees were plantation owners or farmers and chose the West Indies as a
211
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suitable venue to continue their business.

Loyalists owned the Panton,

Leslie and Company, which was one of the most successful trading firms
in the West Indies with business networks in Britain and America.
Despite the appearance of a loyalist idyll, the reality of exile in the
West Indies was unsatisfactory for many. British ministers could not
guarantee the land was fertile, nor could many crops survive the brutal
hurricanes that swept the Islands in 1784.218 For instance, the chosen area
of location in Jamaica was reported as "nothing more than a large
morass.. .swarming with scorpions, serpents, lizards...nothing but the most
ridiculous infatuation could tempt any men to expose their own lives to
9 1Q

such an unpromising situation."

In addition, although historians argue

the loyalists "infused the inert colony with fresh blood and energy," the
native Creole population were not quite as effusive about the new
990

immigrants.

Disagreements centred on issues of representation, with the

native population perceiving loyalist involvement in government as a
desire to "take over" and the refugees feeling original inhabitants' rights
were prioritized at their expense.

Governor Maxwell characterized the

"merchants and people who hope to return to the continent" as the most
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troublesome, partly for their demands but mostly because they stayed in
commercial centers rather than accept tracts of land in the outer islands.
The Board of American Loyalists based in Nassau in the Bahamas
was organized in response to these disagreements. Led predominantly by
James Hepburn of North Carolina and John Wells of South Carolina, the
exiles complained about the administration, highlighting improper
representation, the lack of regulation of the law, and corruption of public
money.

They denounced Governor Maxwell's address to the assembly

as, "illiberal, untrue and malicious," designed to undermine and demonize
the loyalist refugees.224 James Hepburn, President of the Board of
American Loyalists articulated their mission "to preserve and maintain
these Rights and Liberties for which we have left our homes and
possessions."225 They achieved this through endless petitions to the
Assembly, refusal to attend Assembly meetings until issues were resolved
and declaring ultimatums; on May 9th 1785, the Board of Loyalists
resolved that as they were not fairly represented in the House of Assembly,
"we are of course not bound by any laws the Assembly might pass."226 In
consequence, the Assembly suspended six of the loyalists for their directly
involvement in the petition and prohibited from holding office in the
future. However, despite these setbacks the loyalists were essentially
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successful in achieving their aims. By 1786, American loyalists dominated
the Bahamanian House of Assembly.227 The struggles and achievements of
the loyalists in the West Indies exemplify the notion of the powerful
periphery in an empire. Additionally, the "problem" of loyalists' dual
allegiance is apparent in the West Indian exiles self-classification as
"American Loyalists."
Surprisingly, given the ideological divisions between loyalists and
patriot Americans, the West Indian refugees' most important achievement
lay in subverting British trade regulations and as a result securing better
trade laws between the West Indies and America in the Jay Treaty
(1796).228 As the dominant political power and a significant proportion of
the Islands merchant and planter population, loyalists played a significant
role in pressuring the British Parliament to retract its restrictions on
American trade. The very first day the Committee on Trade met in
London, it received numerous petitions from West Indian merchants and
planters.229 This group designed the petitions to generate sympathy,
highlighting fear of starvation if Britain refused American vessels
permission to trade in West Indian ports.

In fact, the refugees put words

into action during times of specific need. Under the jurisdiction of Loyalist
Governors like James Powell, the West Indian ports were illegally opened
227
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to American vessels. For example, during the violent hurricanes of July
1784, August 1785 and October 1786 Jamaican ports, which had been the
worst affected, were open to free trade in order to assuage the devastation
done to crops and foodstuffs.231 The discretionary power afforded to the
Governors of the Islands' by the metropole became, according to Alice
Keith the norm rather than the exception.232
In addition, Bryan Edwards, a sugar planter in the British West
Indies, feared the restrictions would cause "500,000 persons to be starved
and a property of 60 million rendered unprofitable and precarious." He
also complained that the broader commercial ramifications that restricting
trade with America would only serve to benefit the commercial success of
the French West Indian islands.233 Another West Indian planter Simon
Taylor accused the British government of "entering into a combination to
Ruin these islands" and likened the plight of the planters to that of the
Gibionites from the bible.234 The vocal actions of Edwards, Taylor, the
Board of American Loyalists and the Loyalist Governors exemplify Jack
Greene's assertion that the peripheries of an empire have as much
influence on the cultural and commercial dynamics on the empire as its
center.235
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Consequently, the efforts of the exiles in the West Indies worked in
tandem with those of the merchants on mainland North America. Although
the American states did not operate as a national unit, the action of
individual states and merchants against the West Indian restrictions
indicates the importance of the issue and demonstrates the relationship
between commerce and national identity. Virginia set the precedent by
lobbying the British parliament and generating a sense of unity of purpose
in America. Virginians drafted a proposal to all thirteen states to give
Congress the authority to enact nationwide prohibitions on the importation
of British West Indian goods in British ships. Virginians argued that the
British restrictions were in conflict with the principles of free commerce
and they should resist by adopting similar prohibitory measures.
The Virginia Act insisted on unity of action across all states,
demanding, "this act shall not be in force until all the states in the union
shall have passed similar laws." The clarity of the language and meaning
in the Act suggests Americans regarded the issue as one of national pride.
St. George Tucker, a lively Virginian who supported his state's proposal,
made this connection with national honor even clearer. In a short pamphlet
reflecting on the matter, Tucker inserted extracts from parliamentary
speeches to incense the reader and encourage support for the proposal. He
portrays Britain as a power hungry bully, eager to strangle American trade
by cleverly inserting quotes from British ministers such as, "we will
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regulate her [America's] markets as we please and give an effectual check
to any attempt on the part of America to advance in ship building or
navigation."237 Tucker's choice of quote is especially pertinent as it
foregrounds the real locus of power; the carrying not the commercial trade.
Massachusetts adopted a similar emotive and proactive response.
Reminiscent of the revolutionary era Boston merchants boycotted British
ships in April 1784. The British regulations forbade American goods to be
exported in British ships and tonnage duties were imposed on all foreign
shipping.238 In so doing, the Boston merchants sought to appropriate
Britain's navigation strategy for their own ends, which reinforces the
vision of the 1780s as a battleground for the revolution's replay.
Newspaper reports reflected the anger and the sense of national offence
Bostonians felt at the British restrictions. In the Continental Journal an
address 'To the People of America' called for a unified response and asked
readers to identify the British restrictions as an insult to "National Honor
[which must] unite with our Interest to prevent injury to the one or insult
to the other."

Another Boston newspaper used an Aesop fable in which

a father taught his sons the importance of working together to convince
them of the necessity of a unified response.240
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This mass hysteria becomes puzzling and more enlightening when
we remember that the economic impact of the embargo was not actually
detrimental to America or the West Indies.241 Selwyn H. Carrington's
recent study of the trade between America and the West Indies, 1783-1807
explains this apparent anomaly. Carrington suggests that the merchants
from the West Indies and America who subverted the regulations were the
main reasons the economic impact of the Revolution was not too severe.
In fact, it was quite common for West Indian merchants to provide
U.S. vessels with British documentation to undercut British restrictions.
Phineas Bond's correspondence with the foreign office in London also
confirms such illegal activity, which he described as so common that, "the
mischief [is becoming] more alarming as the fraud is become general." In
a letter dated December, 1787, Bond wrote with excitement that he had
proof that American vessels were using illegal documentation (British
papers) to trade illegally with the West Indies and Asia.244 Indeed, in 1785
Horatio Nelson wrote Lord Sydney that despite British restrictions, "nearly
the whole Trade between the British Colonies and the United States of
America was carried out in American bottoms."245 In September of the
same year, Bermuda was described to be in a state of "anarchy" as their
merchants had furnished American vessels with false papers in order to
241
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flout British prohibitions.246 James Edward Powell, Governor of the
Bahamas was indignant that American products were smuggled into his
jurisdiction.247 In 1789, two American vessels, the Patty from North
Carolina and the Dunmore from South Carolina were seized by Custom
948

Officials in the Bahamas for breaching the laws of trade.

In September

1785 another American ship was seized in St Eustatius charged with trade
in a "foreign bottom."249 The press reported the seizures in such a way as
to suggest that the illegal trade was widespread. Reports complained about
the volume of customs officials and the vigor with which they seized
American vessels in or even near British waters.
The actions of Tench Coxe, also a merchant of Philadelphia helps
peel back the layers of how merchants dealt with the British trade
restrictions and sheds light on the loyalist merchant networks in North
America. Frazier, Coxe and Company was a big concern, with five full
time clerks in addition to Coxe and his business partner, Nalbro Frazier.
They had a large warehouse for storage in addition to a spot on the wharf
where cargo was unloaded and often sold directly.251 The five clerks
employed were either friends or family members, a very traditional setup
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for merchant businesses in the eighteenth century.252 Daniel Coxe, Tench's
loyalist brother who had helped form the West Jersey Volunteers during
the Revolution was on the books.253 Archibald McCall, who was not a
proscribed loyalist, worked intimately with Coxe throughout the
Revolution and into the national period, especially on the proposals for a
Second Bank of America. According to Coxe, McCall was "bred" with the
Coxe family and business, which suggests McCall identified socially, if
not legally as a Loyalist. Key to Coxe's success in the West Indian market
was stable business relationships in the West Indies and London.

In St

Croix, Coxe re-established business links with Benjamin Yard and
Nicholas Cruger who chose to overlook Coxe's compromised political past
in favour of a profitable trade.255 In terms of the trade itself, Coxe's
biographer Jacob Cooke asserts that the bulk of it was with the British
Caribbean islands most of which took place legally in British vessels.
However, Coxe and his partner Nalbro Frazier did own six of their own
ships, three of which they constantly used as trading vessels to the islands
throughout the 1780s.

Coxe and Nalbro Frazier solicited 'buyers' for

these ships in London and the Islands. No money changed hands in these
transactions and the ships remained in Philadelphia but were registered
252
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either to a Moses Franks of London or Bell and La Touche of Jamaica.
This enabled the vessel to carry British registration papers and thus, in
theory trade legally between the United States and the West Indies.
Another tactic merchants used to undermine British restrictions on
American vessels was handling the exchange of trade too quickly to
detect. They also eluded the prohibitions by navigating trade through the
French West Indies.258 However, this was not always a safe measure as
French officials attempted to prohibit the import of American goods,
particularly flour. In 1785 for example numerous raids of stores took place
in Martinque and Guadeloupe searching for American flour after thirty
American vessels were seized in the French territory.

The success of

the combined force of each of these tactics may help explain the recording
of 635 US ships and 439 French West Indian ships in British West Indian
ports in 1785.260
* * *

The Treaty of Amity and Commerce or, as it is more commonly called the
Jay Treaty (1796) occupies a contested place in American history. It
represents the apogee of the lobbying and subversions of British
navigation policy and exemplifies the important role merchants, some of
whom were former loyalists, played in the shaping of an American
commercial policy. In the spring of 1793 within the context of the Anglo-
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French war, Britain decided certain raw food materials were contraband
and prohibited any vessels from supplying French islands in the West
Indies with corn, flour or meal.
Such restrictions however, were secret; American politicians, merchants
and sailors were not privy to these developments until March of the
following year when the news became public by which time the Royal
Navy had seized 300 American ships in the West Indies.262
This behaviour, according to the Treaty's most recent historian
Todd Estes' made a diplomatic mission to Great Britain inevitable. As the
chosen American delegate, John Jay had the unenviable task of negotiating
a treaty that would meet the demands of the American merchants. The
tension building since the Treaty of Paris (1783) found diplomatic
articulation in the guidelines given to John Jay. American shipping and
trade rights to the Caribbean was one of only two non-negotiable clauses
from the American perspective.

The Americans requested open rights to

trade with the West Indies using American vessels. Britain answered these
demands in Article 12 of the treaty, which stipulated that American vessels
were free to trade in any port. Critically, the article included a caveat
which insisted only vessels under 70 tons would be permitted. Americans
interpreted this caveat as a "severely limiting" qualification and an insult
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to an independent nation trading in the international market.

After

thirteen years of unsatisfactory navigation relations, the American
politicians refused to accept halfway measures and they never ratified
article 12.
The contested twelfth article of the treaty opened the floodgates to
a wave of Anglophobia fought out in the press and pamphlet literature of
the period. Republicans such as Benjamin Franklin Bache a newspaper
editor, and John Beckley, a political aid lambasted Jay and the so-called
"British Treaty" for submitting to the ex-imperial power. In his newspaper
the Aurora, Bache declared, "It is time Americans had done with humbly
petitioning the British court to do them justice." Beckley interpreted the
treaty's terms as an attempt to undermine American independence and
worked to shape public opinion to denounce George Washington for
supporting the treaty as an "indelible character in charge of a British
faction."265 Despite widespread support for the anti-treaty movement, the
Federalists ultimately overcame the vitriol and both nations ratified Jay's
Treaty in March 1796. 266
It was the merchants support for Jay's Treaty in the big port cities
of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia that cemented its success. James
Watson, a merchant of New York counselled his fellow citizens to
examine the treaty carefully and make a measured analysis based on
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evidence rather than hearsay. In July of 1795, merchants held a rally in
support of the treaty at Tontine Coffee House and New York and
Bostonian merchants followed suit in August. Philadelphia's merchant
class even composed a public address to the President on the topic, urging
him to ratify for the sake of American commercial prosperity.
Unfortunately, there are no firm links between these merchants and those
of the pre-revolutionary era. However, Wallace Brown's identification of
the loyalists as a commercial class and the findings in chapter one on the
importance of economic viability for post war reintegration encourage
speculation that the loyalists continued to act as merchants and traders.
Despite the paucity of sources to provide concrete evidence, this chapter
does demonstrate the continuities in ideology and hostilities between the
colonial and national period. The question of navigation as a signifier of
power and control persisted throughout the transition period from colony
to nation. It provided the locus around which Americans, Britons and
American Loyalists reconfigured their relationships and provided an
opportunity for the latter to demonstrate their role as active citizens in a
changing empire.

Estes, 87-91.
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Chapter 3
A Literary Reincarnation; The First 'Un-Americans' in Popular Print
Culture 1820-1850
Finding refuge from his loyalist-hating neighbours in Boston in
1774, Massachusetts-born Benjamin Thompson narrowly escaped
punishment at the brush stroke of the tar and feather.268 North Carolinians
were not too fond of him either; as the leader of a loyalist regiment, he was
the "devil incarnate."269 Yet, in 1833, Godey 's Lady's Book celebrated him
as an "eminent self-taught American" alongside Benjamin Franklin and
270

Benjamin West.

Daniel Leonard experienced a similar fate when

punished for denouncing the Committee of Correspondence as the
"foulest, subtlest, and most venomous thing."271 Upon his death in
Massachusetts in 1829 however, the Salem Gazette remembered him with
respect and high praise as a "distinguished citizen of Bristol County," a
"Refugee for the loyalist cause" and a valuable progenitor of the iron
industry.272
In 1774, the New England Committeemen condemned Thompson
and Leonard's behavior as "inimical" to the American cause.
Consequently, they were classified as "conspicuous" Tories and therefore,
268
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according to the terms defined in the Test Act (1777) banished into exile.
Thompson and Leonards' subsequent reappraisal in popular print culture
in the 1830s further complicates the classification of the American
Loyalists delineated in the previous chapters. According to the categories
outlined in Alexander Hamilton's Phocions' Letter for example, were
Thompson and Leonard considered to be "aliens" or "disloyal citizens?"
Thompson and Leonards' metaphorical rebirth as worthy American
citizens provides an access point to assess what happened to the internal
exiles that remained in the United States and the loyalist refugees in the
West Indies to enable this transformation to take place.
This chapter examines the perception and memory of loyalists in
popular print culture at a time when America found itself in a new struggle
with Great Britain. The way loyalists were remembered and rehabilitated
reinforced the perception of the War of 1812 as the Second American
Revolution. The memory of loyalists served a dual function: to provide a
model for Americans to define their national identity against and in so
doing demonstrated the process of earning American citizenship based on
merit.
***

The questions of navigation and naturalization that dominated the
political commercial landscape in the 1780s and the 1790s collided in the
middle of the Atlantic Ocean in June 1807. In search of three alleged
deserters of the British navy, the frigate Leander fired on the American
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vessel, the Chesapeake. Newspapers reported the American outrage at the
incident because Britain and America were not at war and there was no
legal justification for the attack. Untangling the two key issues at the heart
of this incident exposes the continued hostility between Britain and
America throughout the early nineteenth century. The LeanderChesapeake conflict provides an opportunity to analyze the meaning of
American citizenship and the development of national identity in the Early
Republic.
The Leander attacked the Chesapeake in June 1807 to express
British frustration with the proliferation of British deserters to the
American navy. Specifically, the attack was a reaction against the leniency
of American naturalization laws that enabled so many British sailors to
defect and evade capture because they qualified for American
protection.273 Yet the foundations of the "lenient" naturalization law of
1805 were grounded in the period of internal conflict throughout the
1770s. The civil war dimension of the Revolution laid the groundwork for
the basic principles of naturalization law that lasted until the 1860s.
At the heart of naturalization was the notion of "volitional
allegiance." It resolved the problem of an individuals' legal identity after
the Revolution by fore-grounding residence as the determiner of loyalty.274
273
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In 1795, the states continued this principle and agreed that an individual
must live in the United States for a period of at least five years before
becoming a naturalized citizen. Indeed, legal historian James Kettner
observes that, "at the heart of the naturalization process remained the idea
that a prolonged term of residence was the surest way of guaranteeing an
alien's attachment to the country and adoption of its ways."275
Additionally, the 1795 Naturalization Law retained the oath of allegiance
and required applicants to renounce their commitment to any other nations
or monarchs as well as relinquish any titles of nobility.276 At this time, it
was clear that the same anxieties over the qualifications for citizenship
expressed in 1783 fueled the debate over the same issues in 1795. The
difference in 1795 was that the debates about qualifications were informed
as much by practical necessities as by the fear of internal enemies. In fact,
Kettner shows that the debates in the 1790s did not reflect either interest or
concern for loyalist exiles.277 Time and location were thus persistent
factors in measuring an individuals' loyalty but also in healing the wounds
caused by internal dissent. The residency requirement reflected the belief
that "time alone could insure that those imbued with "foreign principles"
had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values and modes of thought
necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous, self-governing
republican community."278 Kettner's observation demonstrates that after
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1795 the naturalization law did not apply to loyalists. As Americans,
loyalists had never been "imbued with foreign principles" and were
therefore already considered well qualified for citizenship.

Peter van

Schaack for example, returned from exile and regained his citizenship as
early as 1784.280 Jacob Duche gained his Pennsylvania citizenship in 1790.
Just one year prior Samuel Shoemaker also acquired his citizenship in the
same state.281 In the final analysis, American law classified the Loyalists
who stayed in the United States after independence as "disloyal citizens"
rather than aliens. They were therefore already citizens of the United
States; they did not need to become 'naturalized.'
The legal status of the loyalists was thus resolved by 1805. But the
Leander affair represented the climax of the other tensions building
between Britain and America since the Treaty of Paris (1783). After the
failure to secure open trading rights to the West Indies in 1783 and again
in 1796, Americans continued their quest for a beneficial commercial
treaty with Great Britain. In the interim period, the 1794 ordinance
governed the terms of American trade to the West Indies. The ordinance
allowed American vessels to trade goods between the West Indies and
Europe but only if the cargo was 'reexported' via a U.S. port.283 In theory,
this meant American ships loaded in the islands, unloaded and re-loaded in
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the U.S. and then continued onto Europe. In practice, American captains
chose to dock in the U.S. and avoid import duties by getting new
documents and keeping the goods on board ship. This practice was
reminiscent of similar subversions against British restrictions in the 1790s
and was worth $60 million by 1805.284 In a series of events, which mirror
the run up to the Jay Treaty, the British navy seized American ships
conducting this trade and formalized their prohibition of the reexport
system in the Essex ruling of 1805.285 Once again, Americans felt slighted
and undermined by the British restrictions. In his capacity as Ambassador
to Britain, James Monroe observed, "in respect to the ministers of other
powers we appear to hold the lowest grade."2 6
The carrying trade issue converged with the issue of naturalization
in the dispute over British impressments of American sailors. Attracted by
higher pay and better working conditions British sailors made up about a
quarter of the crew on American merchant vessels.

In a bid to reclaim

their subjects, the Royal Navy employed press gangs to board American
merchant vessels and "press" British men into leaving. Not only did
Americans perceive this as an affront to their independence but also
American citizens were often mistaken for British ones and taken.
Diplomatic historian Donald Hickey estimates that about 6,000 American
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citizens suffered this fate in the period 1803-1812.

The seriousness of

this issue is exemplified by the failure of the Monroe-Pickney Treaty in
1806. Designed to resolve the issue of navigation rights to the West Indies
the treaty failed to pass the senate because it ignored the question of
impressments of American sailors. In fact, Jefferson refused to forward the
terms to the senate, as he knew Congress would not be ratify it.

Just as

the issue of navigation in the 1780s and 1790s reignited revolutionary
rhetoric, so too the Leander affair caused public outrage. The newspaper,
the Aurora reported the "young are animated by the highest sensations of
military ardor, and the heroes of the war are shedding tears of joy at the
revival of the spirit of the Revolution."290 The combination of navigation
and naturalization infused Americans with a degree of patriotism unseen in
the Early Republic.
Surprisingly, the Jefferson administration's reaction to the crisis
contrasted with the public desire for war and alienated the merchants and
planters in the West Indies. Until 1796, the West Indian and American
merchants united in thought and effort to improve American shipping
rights to the West Indies.

However, Jefferson's decision to enact an

embargo on trade to force the British to a mutually beneficially agreement
alienated the West Indian merchants. They actually benefited from the
reduced competition the embargo caused and therefore supported the
8
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metropoles' position. Indeed, according to historian Jeanne Rossignol
although the embargo "meant the Republican leaders could implement the
policy of commercial retaliation they had been dreaming of since 1789;" in
1805 it was outdated and misplaced.292 In the climate of fear and
Anglophobia generated by these disputes, the memory of those who had
been disloyal during the Revolution provided literary ammunition for
patriotic fervor.
Emerging during a decade of Anglophobia and war fever, the
debates over American citizenship transitioned from concerns about
requirements and qualifications to the meaning of citizenship as both a
legal and conceptual identity.293 Individual loyalists did not actively take
part in this debate, but the process of remembering loyalists both
individually and collectively did influence the nature of the conclusion.
Popular culture achieved this in two ways: first, by re-ascription of the
term Tory from application to the Revolutions' enemies to the
Republican's weapon of political insult. Secondly, newspapers promoted
successful individual loyalists in popular print as exemplars of citizenship
earned through hard work and merit.
***

To the Young Republic finding its feet on the world stage, the War
of 1812 represented a re-enactment of their Revolution. Britain once again
played the role of the oppressive tyrant, intent on stripping America of her
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liberty and freedom.294 Use of the label "Tory" proliferated vigorously
within the context of internal crisis. From Rhode Island to Louisiana,
newspapers began to trace its origin to mean "Irish robber" or "murderer,"
and at the height of the War the Alexandria Herald likened Tories to
"Canker worms...incessantly gnawing at the tree of liberty." The use of
"Irish" associated the term "Tory" with the negative notion of the "other:"
something different to be feared and reviled. The correlation of Tories
with animals was a legacy from the Revolutionary period, when
newspapers debased and defiled the British and loyalist enemy by
presenting them as chickens, asses, vultures and geese.295 The
Washingtonian echoed the same sentiment in February of 1812 when the
reporter advised holding Tories over fires to "smell them out." 2 % Just as in
the Revolutionary period, such articles implied that Tories were
subhuman, and certainly not American. However, in 1812 the implication
was metaphorical rather than real. It expressed not only a sense of
frustration but also patriotism in response to the British attacks on
American shipping rights.
There were similarities between the impact of the term "Tory" in
1812 and the effect of the loyalists' presence in the 1780s. In 1784, the
loyalists provoked partisan differences in New York and Philadelphia
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between those who favored a conciliatory approach, such as Alexander
Hamilton and those who advocated retribution. In 1812, the Republicans
recycled the term Tory and used it against the Federalists as a rhetorical
insult. In doing so, the Republican party encouraged the voting public to
perceive the Federalists' as the "British Party" and thus as contemporary
villains of American sovereignty. For example, even before War broke out,
the American Mercury likened the Federalists' opposition to the conflict to
Benedict Arnold's treachery in 1775. The article adopted a sarcastic tone
to reinforce the link between the Federalists' current support for high taxes
with the dispute over enforced taxation that sparked the Revolution.
Recalling the volatile taxation issues from the Revolution allowed the
Democratic-Republicans to portray the Federalists as enemies to American
liberty and sovereignty. The American Mercury warned its readers that
"An enemy within is equally fatal now as in 1775.. .He who is not for us is
907

against us."

In addition, The Investigator articulated the use of Tory

towards Federalists most explicitly and simply,
We understand that great exceptions are taken to the name Tory, by which we
choose to designate the people who call themselves Federalists, Friends of
Peace. If we knew any other name more appropriate, we would certainly gratify
these gentleman. But as we do not...we must...use the word Tory until a better
can be found.
The reporter stated explicitly why the term Tory was so appropriate; it
referred to enemies of their own country, someone who supported the

American Mercury, No Headline, January 1, 1812.
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British right to taxation, and submitted in the face of British tyranny.
Federalists responded by attempting unsuccessfully to use the association
to their advantage. In a satirical poem in the Northern Whig the poet
affected a Democrat's mocking tone and denounced the Federalist
opposition as simply "stories/Forged by a gang of Tories." 2 " The reporter
concluded by warning of the desolation war would cause. He urged that
the Federalists' 'stories' ought to be taken seriously to avoid the potential
crisis. Both of the above articles highlight how popular the term "Tory"
was by 1812 and illustrate the real partisan divisions it caused.
The Federalist defense reflects how powerful "Tory" was as an
insult to the party. In a serious article published in the Baltimore Federal
Republican and reprinted in at least one other newspaper in Virginia the
reporter went to great lengths to refute the charge of British influence on
the Federalist Party. The article listed evidence meticulously and endlessly
to contest the charge. It especially highlighted the Federalists' opposition
to the Jay Treaty (1796). This was a particularly powerful example
because most Americans perceived Jay's Treaty as a symbol of continued
American weakness in international trade and navigation. The Federalists'
opposition to the so-called "British Treaty" was upheld as evidence of the
party's American patriotism. 30° Unfortunately, for the Federalists' the
attempt to resist the British Tory label was unsuccessful. Towards the
298
299
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war's end the Delaware Gazette, Washingtonian, Baltimore Patriot, and
countless other Republican papers still used the term Tory as synonymous
with being a 'British supporting Federalist.'301 Perhaps the clearest
example of its persistence was the Independent Chronicle's observation in
April 1815 that the "American Federalists" needed to disassociate
inn

themselves from the "British Federalists" if they wanted to survive.

By

referring to the Federalists as Tories, the Republican-Democrats
successfully linked the Federalist opposition to the War of 1812 with the
British hostility to American Independence. They created the idea that the
Federalists were essentially un-American, thereby signaling the death knell
of that party.303
Despite the demise of the Federalists as a viable political
opposition, the use of "Tory" continued in the 1830s. Newspaper
manipulated the memory of punishment for loyalism during the
Revolution to demonstrate 'Un-American' behavior. Antebellum
Americans rarely participated in the practice of charivari or tarring and
feathering in the same way Americans had in the 1770s. Nevertheless,
when incidents occurred newspapers used it as an educational tool to
denote the meaning of American citizenship. During the Revolution,
patriotic Americans celebrated tar and feathering as an "American"
Delaware Gazette and Peninsula Advertiser, September 1, 1814, Washingtonian, "Tory-British Agent
British Gold," February 8, 1813, Baltimore Patriot, August 31, 1815,2.
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invention. By 1825, the Middlesex Gazette saw fit to prove the act was of
British rather than American origin, citing an extract from an English
seaman's chronicles to prove it.304 Two years later the Portsmouth Journal
of Literature and Politics claimed it was "as old as the Crusades."305 In
1845, the Barre Patriot described the tar and feathering of a citizen to
reclaim debts as "a real piece of Indian business." This was a deliberate
effort to minimize its association with the Revolution and present the
tradition as an 'Indian' rather than American tradition.306 The correlation
between tarring and feathering as punishment by and for the 'other' was
reinforced by an article in the Southern Patiot, which described the victims
of the act as looking like "two African monsters."307
The selectivity of this memory in the popular press also seems to
serve an educational purpose for its readers; in 1835, the Natches
community of Maine took justice into their own hands by whipping and
then tar and feathering a man they accused of murdering his wife.
Readers were encouraged to support such actions; they were reassured it
was a "great day" because the punishment was dealt out by "the most
respectable citizens of Natches." In contrast, a month later five New
304
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England publications expressed disgust when a woman from Onodaga
County was tarred and feathered as rebuke because her "fame was
considered doubtful in the village." 309 By 1839, newspapers had
successfully separated tarring and feathering from its Revolutionary
connotations. They marginalized it as a British or medieval invention and
distanced it from 'American' behavior by characterizing it as a ritual
inflicted only by savages. In this way, newspapers offered its readers
examples of 'Un-American' behavior: a good citizen was not violent
towards their wives, nor did he partake in primitve rituals of public
shaming. Finally, only well-respected members of a community had the
moral authority to inflict such a barbaric punishment and only for an
especially callous crime. Such reports worked as moral lessons and
reflected the meaning of American citizenship as one earned on merit
rather than inherited status.
In the 1820s, the Jacksonian Democrats reinforced the use of
'Tory' with negative aristocratic connotations. Jackson created his
egalitarian image through his presentation as the 'self-made' man. He
made direct appeals to the electorate and characterized his political
opponents as selfish aristocrats.310 Jacksonian Democrats portrayed their
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opponents as men who attended "Pit Club dinners" instead of representing
constituents. If Jackson was the "People's President" his opponents had to
be men "who regard high rent to be peace and high prices to be plenty."
In popular newspapers, the Democrats ridiculed the National Republicans
for their placement of hereditary titles over individual merit. As the Times
and Hartford Advertizer suggested, a Tory is "distinguished for no
personal quality, he prides himself upon once having a grandfather."
However, a Tory was not simply someone to ridicule, but a threat to the
interests of the American public, "He thinks that poor people ought neither
to write, read, marry.. .They ought always to work."
An illustrative anecdote that appeared in the same year in at least
six newspapers further demonstrated Tory as a term of ridicule and
inadequacy. In reply to the accusation that her husband was a Tory, a
woman replied, "her husband was one of the greatest libertines in all that
part of the country."314 The misuse of'libertine' for 'liberty' reinforced
both the dim-witted nature of Tories, as well as their inability to
comprehend the meaning of 'liberty,' and thus their fundamental
ineptitude to represent the interests of most Americans. In addition, a
'libertine' encouraged readers to link the image of a Tory with that of a
dissolute, a man without social or sexual morals.315 At least five
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newspapers in New York and Massachusetts reprinted the article,
indicating the circulation and popularity it enjoyed.

The connection

between Tory as a byword for negative aristocratic characteristics and
unintelligent animals foregrounds the role it played in educating
Americans about the expectations and responsibilities of citizenship. The
presentation of 'Tories' was illustrative of the American concept of
citizenship as a role that had to be earned and deserved rather than a status
decreed by a privilege of birth.3 7
The Bank Crisis of 1832-33 provided an opportunity for the term
"Tory" to re-explode onto the scene.318 Both the Democrats and the Whigs
fought in the popular press for the right to denounce the other as Tories.
For the Whigs, Andrew Jackson's veto was an abuse of his rights
stipulated in the Constitution and echoed the actions of a tyrannical King.
The use of "King Andrew" cartoons was common and encouraged readers
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to equate Jackson's veto as akin to Charles Fs tyranny in England. This
was a particularly loaded association as Charles Fs tyranny ended with
execution.320 However, the Democrats alone successfully linked 'Tory'
specifically and directly to negative images of aristocracy and traitors from
the Revolution. For example, during the State elections of New York in
1834 the Salem Gazette sarcastically likened the Whig victory to that of
the British "and Tories" at Bunker Hill; the implication being a practical
triumph but neither a moral or a permanent one.

Six years later, the

Hudson River Chronicle denounced the Whig leadership as "quite as
insolent as their red coat predecessors."322 Such direct references to the
Tories of the revolution encouraged readers to associate the treacherous
characteristics of the first 'Un-Americans' with the modern day Whig
Party. Jackson's re-election after the bank crisis indicates the success of
the Democrats campaign.323
In this way, loyalists from the American Revolution, the 'original
Tories' indirectly retained their place in the national consciousness
through continued negative use of the term 'Tory.' This demonstrates that
the Revolution did not define American identity absolutely or statically.
The memory of the British and loyalist enemy continued to evolve and
adapt to the changing nature of American society. Popular print culture
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found a way of reconfiguring the Revolutionary enemy in a contemporary
context. The revival of the term as a political weapon in the Early
Republic demonstrated the legitimate acceptance of political disagreement.
Internal disloyalty in the Revolution was not a crime but a sign of a
healthy republic. Newspapers reinforced this idea by recognition of
individual loyalist accomplishments in popular culture in the 1830s. The
rehabilitation of previously disloyal citizens contributed to the meaning of
American citizenship as a role that was not just pre-ordained in law but an
individual earned status.
***

The metaphorical transformation of Benjamin Thompson, or Count
Rumford as he was later knighted is the most extreme, and therefore an
illuminating case for analysis. Thompson was born in America but decided
to support the Crown during the Revolution. Historian Robert Munro
Brown argues that Thompson's loyalism was motivated as much by selfinterest as genuine political affiliation. Brown asserts Thompson "swore
allegiance to whichever side was most profitable to him."324 In contrast,
his biographers adopt a more positive characterization that illustrates the
complexity of Thompson's character.

Regardless, the vilification of

Thompson by his contemporaries in 1774 testifies to his unpopularity.
Hiding first in Woburn, Charleston, and finally, Boston, the
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Committeemen arrested Thompson in May of 1775, "upon suspicion of
being inimical to the liberties of this country."326 Although the local
Committee of Safety acquitted him, Thompson left America for England,
• •

327

never to return as a permanent citizen.
New Hampshire's Alienation Act of 1778 listed Thompson as one
of many American loyalists ordered to leave the State, relinquish his
property, and return only upon pain of death.

New Hampshire

newspapers printed the Act in full to ensure that all residents knew the
local law would enforce a $500 fine to anyone found assisting any of the
proscribed men. In fact, the state legislature contravened Article V of the
Treaty of Paris by selling Thompson's property. Newspapers advertised
the sale alongside many others and were neither reactionary nor emotive in
style. This indicates how common such advertisements were and suggests
many loyalists lost their property in this way.

Indeed, in Massachusetts,

returning loyalist Samuel Goldbury tried to reclaim £1000 in lost property
but local residents forced him to retract the claim through "threats on his
life [that] forced him to hide." Even Frederick William Geyer, a former
loyalist but awarded citizenship with voting rights in Massachusetts could
not gain restoration of his property.330 In fact, the Board of American
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Loyalists in London formed because they knew property restitution from
the states themselves would not be successful.
According to the criteria discussed in chapter one Thompson was a
"real British subject." He left American soil in 1774 before the Declaration
of Independence and never returned. His location coupled with his
"inimical" behavior determined his national identity. Despite this, by 1832
the process of his reassessment in popular print culture was well
underway. Just a year later his crimes had not only been forgiven, but
forgotten. For example, in March of 1832 Godey's Lady's Book published
a very intriguing short story about aristocracy. In the story, Count
Rumford explored his own role in the revolution, and sought to redeem his
crimes of "living a trifler [in order to] die a man."332 Just as the political
newspapers castigated aristocracy, Godey 's portrayed aristocracy
negatively, although it couched its criticisms in more poetic language. For
example, it likened aristocrats to polished brass as both "appear more
valuable than gold." The image illustrates the magazines, (and by
extension its reader's) criticism of empty aristocratic values. It implied that
external appearances of wealth and greatness were not accurate reflections
of a genuine moral character. The use of "valuable" was significant
because it introduced the idea that states awarded citizenship to individuals
who demonstrated skill and/or commitment to the prosperity of the nation.
Rumford was a particularly useful vehicle for this message because he was
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not born into aristocracy but married into it. This message found full
articulation in the innocent and lyrical poem at the end of the article.
Rumford allegedly wrote the poem himself and it conveyed his desire to
throw off his aristocratic yoke, and aspire to the author's definition of "the
most agreeable of all companions... .a simple, frank man, without any high
pretensions to oppressive greatness."333 Rumford's fictional rejection of
his adopted aristocracy illuminates the understanding of what it meant to
be American in 1830s: one had to be of simple means and pure ways to
qualify as a valuable citizen of the American Republic.
Godey's recognition of Rumford's loyalist and aristocratic past
paved the way for his forgiveness, and the collective amnesia about his
past a year later. By 1833, Godey's celebrated the Count as an "eminent
self-taught American."334 The inclusion of Benjamin Franklin in the same
article reinforced the notion that Godey 's rehabilitated Rumford not as a
loyalist or a Tory, but as an American. Significantly, whereas historian
Eileen Cheng found nineteenth century historians allowed individuals a
simultaneous loyalist and American identity, popular print culture
emphasized the latter at the expense of the former.335 For example, the
New Hampshire Gazette remembered Rumford's "honorable fame and
exalted greatness" rather than his role as a spy and leader of a loyalist

ii4

Godey's Lady's Book, "Eminent Self Taught Americans," (Philadelphia, April, 1833,) Vol. VI, 150.
335 335 g j j e e n Ka-Ma Cheng, "American Historical writers and the Loyalists, 1788-1856: Dissent,
Consensus, and American Nationality", in Journal of the Early Republic, 23. No.4 (2003) 491 -519.

104
militia.336 It also forgave his support of the Crown by explaining it was a
practical decision. They suggested the patriot army denied Thompson the
opportunity to utilize his mathematical skills.337 Moreover, the article
interpreted Thompson's choice of "Rumford" as a sign of his affinity for,
and sense of belonging to the Rumford community in Massachusetts. For
Godey's this was further proof of Thompson's identity as an American. In
1841, inhabitants of South Woburn named a town in Rumford's honor.
This testifies to the powerful nature of popular cultures portrayal of
Rumford as an eminent American.
Southern newspapers identified Rumford's fame six years later, but
were no less keen to rehabilitate his American identity over his loyalist
persuasions. They also emphasized his roots as a farmer's boy in rural
Massachusetts rather than the aristocrat he became through marriage.339
The Southern Patriot of Charleston and Houston Telegraph of Texas
regarded it as their civic duty to inform citizens "it is not generally known,
as it should be," that the successful, "celebrated" famous Count Rumford,
"was an American."340 The only qualification he required was his birth in
America, (though they get the town wrong, Waldo instead of Woburn). By
1850, the New Hampshire Sentinel had done away with any reference to
his Tory past, informing its readers that Rumford retired to England before
336
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the Revolution.

In contrast to the rehabilitation of loyalists by

nineteenth-century historians and novelists, popular print culture
encouraged not simply rehabilitation, but also a collective forgetting of
Count Rumford's dishonor during the Revolution.
In many ways, Rumford is a unique example. His contribution to
theories of modern science, generous donations to the American Academy
of Arts and Science and his founding of the Royal Institution of London
make him an unsurprising figure for rehabilitation.

Indeed, his

reassessment began when he died in 1814 when newspapers remembered
his scientific and political achievements with high praise and admiration. It
is significant to note that while eulogies on his death reported he was
"born in Massachusetts," popular culture did not embrace him as an
"American" until 1833.343 This seems to reflect the process of becoming
American; newspapers presented it not as a status or identity instantly
achieved, but a gradual progression of self-reflection and improvement.
Coverage of Daniel Leonard's death varied according to region. As
a native of Massachusetts, the Salem Gazette remembered him warmly and
positively as a "distinguished citizen of Bristol County."344 The Haverhill
Gazette's report was more factual as they described him as "a native of
341
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Massachusetts and a classmate at Harvard College of the late Ex President
John Adam's."345 However, unlike the Rhode Island American, and
Maryland's Republican Star, the Massachusetts paper totally omitted the
information that Leonard "was almost the last survivor of the loyalists who
were expatriated from the United States for their adherence to the British
Government." The newspapers' exclusion of Leonard's loyalist past hints
at Massachusetts collective forgetting of his loyalist identity. Just as Count
Rumford had earned his right to citizenship by his valuable contribution to
the world of science, so too Leonard's position as Chief Justice of
Bermuda and progenitor of the valuable iron industry saved him from
vilification.

6

Thomas Hutchinson's unpopularity in the colonies in the build up to
the Revolution is well known.

Yet the man who was burned in effigy on

the streets of Boston, Philadelphia and Princeton in 1773, that "vile
serpent" whose treachery was portrayed as akin to Caligula or Nero's, was
remembered much less severely in the late 1820s.348 Upon publication of
Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts in 1827, the Salem Gazette
described it as "valuable," and Hutchinson as a "faithful historian," its
readers were encouraged to anticipate it with excitement.349 A year later
the Essex Gazette confirmed that positive response, echoing the "valuable"
345
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description and proving that the publishers had generated a lot of interest
and money for "beautiful" volumes imported from London.350 Another
year later the Baltimore Patriot proved that Hutchinson's History was read
outside Massachusetts. In fact, the newspaper looked to Hutchinson as an
authority on the overestimated value of the Spanish currency.351
While these examples do not suggest that Americans as a whole
embraced Hutchinson as a 'true American,' or accepted his rehabilitated, it
does illustrate the 'selective memory' of individual loyalists' past. In
contrast to the generic use of Tory as a byword for enemy, popular culture
redeemed individual loyalists based on their actions after the Revolution.
The rehabilitation of loyalists in memory mirrors the reintegration of
actual loyalists in the 1780s. In the 1780s, loyalists could earn their
citizenship by providing useful skills to the new republic. In the 1830s,
newspaper redeemed them if their post-war actions benefited the image of
American identity.
James Rivington was the 'King's Printer' in New York throughout
the Revolutionary period. Born in England, Rivington was criticized in the
1770s for his "haughty domineering spirit," his "wicked imagination" and
attempts to foster discord and disunion through publication of 'lies' in his
i n

newspaper.

Rivington feared for his life and was unable to return to his

home or family after a mob acted out their verbal threats and destroyed his
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printing press.

Yet by 1827, a Hartford publication not only ignored his

loyalist past, but trusted one of his articles on the freemasons from 1770.
They used it to ridicule the New Haven Journal's claims to a "discovery"
of the secrets of freemasonry.354 The Salem Gazette drew on his work for
similar purposes in 1836. The Gazette undermined the Boston Journal's
claim that they were the first to print "the traitor" Major Andre's infamous
poem.355 Moreover, in 1839 the Houston Telegraph delighted in printing
an anecdote from the Revolution that encouraged forgiveness of
Rivington's past. The story traces the character of Ethan Allen, a staunch
patriot who described Rivington as an honest and honorable man. Allan
enjoyed an evening of drinks with the Tory and fostered a memory of
Rivington as a good sport rather than a publisher of royalist propaganda.356
Again, treatment of Rivington was by no means effusive by 1839, nor was
he regarded as American. However, his role as the King's Printer, which
the revolutionaries once considered a great threat to American liberty and
freedom, was minimized and largely forgotten in favor of using him as
figure of knowledge and an example of a "good sport."
In contrast, newspapers emphasized and demonized the loyalist
past of Donald McDonald. McDonalds' infamy was well known. During
the Revolution, he fought for the Crown, not in the traditional "redcoat"
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sense but rather as the leader of a band of bloodthirsty Indians.

Seventy-

two years after the actual event the Maryland Sun remembered
McDonald's most famous and gruesome attack.358 The event centered
around McDonald's failed attack on the house of a patriot family. The Sun
described McDonald as a "white scoundrel" who used tomahawks as
weapons and "held rebels on pitchforks over fires." The reader was
encouraged to regard McDonald as of the "animal order," emphasized by
the barbaric weapons he carried and the Indian company he kept. In
addition, the article portrayed McDonald as rather dim-witted. In the
conclusion of the story, Shell the patriot captured McDonald as one would
a defenseless animal; "He at once seized the astonished and all but
exultant Tory and drew him into the house, and before any of the gentry
outside knew the transaction, McDonald was aprisonerV Indeed, the
adjacent but apparently unrelated article, "A Dumb Man's Wit" seems
strategically placed.359 For this generation of Americans more removed
from the Revolution than those of earlier decades, likening Tories to
contemporary understandings of 'otherness' (Indians) helped to exemplify
the meaning of Un-American behavior. It provided a stark contrast to the
valuable and virtuous citizens like Rumford and Leonard and therefore
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helped clarify the meaning of American citizenship by providing someone
to define it against.360
In contrast to the restoration of loyalists like Rumford, Leonard,
Hutchinson, and Rivington, McDonald's vilification suggests that
ideological opposition was valid but violent disagreement was
unacceptable. In addition, McDonald's actions and values counseled
readers on the role of the American citizen as one they had to earn or
achieve, rather than a natural right by birth. While both Rumford and
McDonald were born on American soil, newspapers forgot and forgave
Rumford's loyalist past because he redeemed himself by rejecting his
noble title (however fictional) and contributed knowledge and value to the
world of science. McDonald on the other hand displayed savage, ill
thought out and irreverent characteristics and Shell killed him before he
had opportunity to reform his ways.
Despite his demise both literally and figuratively, Donald
McDonald lived on in print in an equally derogatory and 'Un-American'
context. Four years after the publication of McDonald's eventful death,
Godey 's Lady's Book featured a short story entitled "The Cave of Eigg"
which featured a Donald McDonald as a "hard and stern" Scottish
chieftain, humanized only by the love for his daughter.361 Other parallels
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exist between the McDonald of Revolutionary fame and that of Godey 's
fiction; both were leaders of a small and unruly band of "savages" and
better men knocked from their self-appointed presumptions.362 James
Beattie and D'Assigny's theories on the formation of memory in the
human mind provide an eighteenth-century context to explain the effect
the conflation of images had on the reader.363 D'Assigny's memory theory
is instructive; he contended that memory was enhanced by definition
against opposites, "when we represent to ourselves Sobriety and
Temperance, we cannot but have a notion of Debauchery and
Intemperance."364 Indeed, using D'Assigny's theory, the authors'
emphasis on savage characteristics and cruel behavior with associations of
McDonald as an enemy to liberty in the Revolution would inspire readers
to position their own identity in absolute opposition; not savage but
civilized, not merciless but kind and forgiving, not a Tory or a Brit but an
American citizen.
***

Popular print culture mirrored the sympathetic reassessment of
loyalists in nineteenth century historiography.365 In these widely read
publications loyalists earned their status as American citizens through a
62
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gradual process of redemption. Americans embraced Benjamin Thompson,
later Count Rumford as a fellow citizen after Thompson's rejection of his
aristocratic title and recognition of the superiority of his humble heritage.
In addition, newspapers emphasized his success and valuable contribution
to the Republic to provide a model of the virtuous American citizen.
Daniel Leonard's 'Americanization' by his native town was only possible
because of Leonard's intellectual, financial and political success. For
Hutchinson the press' depiction was more ambiguous. Newspapers did not
challenge his value as an historian but they did not explicitly redeem his
personal character. Nevertheless, the American press eventually forgot his
loyalist past to emphasize the gradual process of becoming a useful
American citizen. James Rivington had always been a colorful personality,
and the newspapers of the Early Republic enjoyed his entertaining
character more than they cared for his allegiance during the Revolution.
As Rivington had been born in England the goal was not to create an
American but rather humanize one of the original enemies, thereby
minimizing their current threat to American liberty and freedom.
McDonald provided an example of the 'other,' an anomaly from which
American readers were conditioned to define themselves against, through
the different established representations of "Tory."
Analysis of newspapers from the Early Republic indicates the
significance of popular print culture's presentation of loyalists. They
provided a model to help demonstrate what it meant to be American and
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how an individual earned meritorious citizenship. By 1805, American law
defined the terms for becoming an American citizen. After 1805, the
rehabilitation of loyalists in print mirrored the ongoing debate about the
cultural and social meaning of an American identity. The first "UnAmericans" were not redundant in the formation of an American identity,
nor was their role a purely negative one. Rather, the memory of those
original Tories acted as a vibrant image to help Americans make sense of
the social and political roots of the New Republic. In contrast to the
traitors and aristocratic imbeciles from the Revolution, Americans were
encouraged to aspire to become self-made men, who sought reward and
respect based on merit and hard-earned labor rather than pre-determined
status. Americans valued loyalty, honesty and communal prosperity over
self-interest. Of course, the idea that American citizenship demanded such
values and virtues is not surprising. But the original and re-incarnated
Tories played a crucial role in shaping and disseminating the meaning of
American citizenship offers an additional perspective. The contrasting
images of Count Rumford as the redeemed traitor with McDonald, the
epitome of everything "Un-American," perhaps serve the most powerful
representation of the dual function loyalists played in the creation of a
unique American national identity.
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Conclusion

The Treaty of Paris (1783) ended the problem of dual allegiance. The
Treaty defined loyalists as either "real British subjects" or disloyal American
citizens based on the individuals' active choice. In practice, local communities
still distrusted former loyalists and discriminated against them throughout the
1780s. Citizens in the new republic identified economic viability as a solution to
the problem of dual allegiance. Individuals like Tench Coxe and Peter Van
Schaack earned their right to American citizenship by offering economic
prosperity and useful skills to their community. Naturalization Laws in 1790,
1795 and 1805 formalized again the legal definition of American loyalists by
including them as full American citizens.
Interestingly, newspapers mirrored the informal qualifiers for citizenship
in the 1830s. Print culture rehabilitated individual loyalists as Americans to
demonstrate the meaning of American citizenship. Readers learned that
citizenship was not just a de facto right of birth but a status deserved through hard
work and individual merit. The problem of dual allegiance translated into a "dual
function" in popular print culture in which loyalists acted as role models of civic
virtue and supplied negative images to define an opposite to American identity.
Loyalist merchants in America and in the West Indies remain elusive.
Future studies can develop knowledge of these key players through archival work
in the port records of strategic import/export towns. Philadelphia seems like a
fruitful place to start. Increased information about these men will further

115
illuminate the problem of dual allegiance in the Early Republic. A study of this
nature can also strengthen the links historians are making between America in the
early national period and those parts of the Atlantic world still within the British
Empire.
Recently, historians have avoided "classifying" the loyalists. Instead, they
focus on a specific individual or region to examine the meaning of the civil
dimensions of the Revolution. Political parties in the 1820s and the 1830s
nullified the classification question by re-ascribing the term "Tory" as a rhetorical
weapon against political opponents. Examination of the "internal exiles" that
stayed in the United States after 1783 must first return to Lorenzo Sabine's
classification method. Compilation of biographic and geographic data of all
loyalists who stayed will supply a foundation to build analysis that is more
nuanced and sophisticated. Historians can then mine voting records and property
documents to ascertain exactly who and how many former loyalists regained
property and voting rights in the Early Republic. Case studies will be a logical
and manageable approach. Scholars could select three states that Wallace Brown
classified as "harsh" and three he deemed "light" in terms of their treatment of
loyalists in the Revolution. This method would ensure a representative analysis
and provide an access point to explore the political, legal and cultural dimensions
of the Early Republic.
Historians have combated the "scattered" problem of the Loyalists
effectively. Classification techniques tried to identify patterns in the ideological
dimensions of loyalism but satisfactorily concluded it was indefinable. Studies of
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loyalists in exile are numerous and extensive. They successfully use the scattered
geographic nature of loyalism to examine the impact of the Revolution on the
larger British Empire. Sections of this thesis suggest that because the loyalists
spread out geographically after the Revolution this aspect of the "loyalist
problem" actually economically benefited both the United States and other parts
of the Atlantic world in the early nineteenth century.
The problem of the loyalists continues to animate current historiography.
Historians are armed with the knowledge that the loyalists were as "American" as
their rebel peers, and have subsequently broadened their historical focus and
approach. Interest in the "losers" from the Revolution no longer recovers the
loyalists to satisfy antiquarian interests but to generate new perspectives on the
legal, political and cultural history of the Early Republic.
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